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INTRODUCTION
Rapid technological advances in communications and
transportation have spurred greater recognition of the need for open
markets.' World and business leaders have concluded that
1. See The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development,
Trade and Transfer of Technology 1 (recounting that World Trade Organization
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technology has greatly expanded the realm of economic
opportunities, making new trade relationships viable and desirable.2
As a result, governments and organizations have made remarkable
progress in not merely pursuing new multilateral and bilateral trade
agreements, but also in exploring and creating more significant and
unique trade relationships that cover a broader range of economic
activities than ever before.' The 1994 decision of the contracting
parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") 4 to
amend their provisional agreement to provide for the creation of a
permanent trade organization dramatically demonstrates this point.'
The establishment of the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
represents an ambitious attempt to expand trade negotiations to
include trade in both goods and services.6 The extraordinary
Members decided to commission research to study the relationship between trade
and technology), at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/dohabriefings/dohal 1-tradetech.pdf
(last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
2. See Press Release, Warren Lavorel, Address at the Coalition of Service
Industries Conference (June 24, 1997) (emphasizing the importance of
globalization and new technologies for economic growth and development), at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres97-e/pr.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
3. See Scott L. Baier & Jeffrey Bergstrand, International Trade in Services,
Free Trade Agreements and the WTO, in SERVICES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY 157 (Robert M. Sterfi ed., 2001) (highlighting the recent explosion in
free trade agreements, as evidenced in the fact that one-third of the roughly one
hundred free trade agreements, covering a broad range of new issues negotiated in
the last fifty years, were reached from 1990-1995).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
5. See Press Brief, World Trade Organization, Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Multilateral Trading System [hereinafter Fiftieth Anniversary] (depicting the
development of the GATT and WTO), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min96_e/chrono.htm (last visited
Oct. 13, 2003); see also Daniel I. Fisher, Note, "Super Jumbo" Problem: Boeing,
Airbus, and the Battle for the Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
865, 871 (2002) (providing background regarding the development of multilateral
trading systems). With twenty-three founding contracting nations, GATT entered
into force on January 1, 1948, as a vehicle to promote tariff reductions in the trade
of goods. Id. The contracting parties hoped to prevent the spiraling tariffs that they
blamed for sparking the Great Depression. Id.
6. See World Trade Organization, What is the World Trade Organization?
(summarizing the WTO's broad aims to include negotiations in trade and services
in an unprecedented manner), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tife/factle.htm (last visited Oct.
22, 2003).
4332003]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
agreement, formulated under the GATT framework of the Uruguay
Round negotiations,7 set the stage for more detailed, specific
agreements pertaining to the trade issues surrounding agriculture,
textiles, intellectual property, and services.8
The WTO continues to build upon the Uruguay Round
achievements, striving for trade liberalization.9 Now as a larger
organization with over 140 members, accounting for ninety-seven
percent of world trade,"° the WTO is tackling one of the most
politically sensitive aspects of world trade by forging ahead on the
negotiations of the General Agreement in the Trade in Services"
("GATS"). 12 The WTO's bold aim to focus international efforts on
7. See World Trade Organization, Legal Texts: The WTO Agreements
(providing an outline and brief description of the various texts that culminated in
the creation of the WTO), at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/ursume.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2003); see also World Trade Organization, The Uruguay Round [hereinafter
Uruguay Round] (outlining key dates and events in the Uruguay Round
negotiations), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tife/fact5_e.htm
(last visited Oct. 13, 2003). The contracting GATT parties initiated the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations in Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986. Id. By
the time the 1993 negotiations concluded in Geneva, Switzerland, 123 countries
were participating, which, according to the WTO, secured its status as the largest
trade negotiation ever. Id.
8. See World Trade Organization, Overview: A Navigational Guide
(introducing crucial elements of the most prominent WTO agreements and giving
brief background information on them), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif e/agrm le.htm (last visited Oct.
13, 2003).
9. See Trading Futures, THE CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Apr. 7, 2003 (noting that
the WTO's GATS negotiations are making slow but positive progress).
10. See World Trade Organization, The Organization (providing an overview
of the organization of the WTO, including a brief discussion of the structure and
identification of its major goals), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/inbriefe/inbrO2_e.htm (last visited
Oct. 13, 2003). The WTO continues to expand as about thirty other nations are
currently negotiating for membership. Id.
11. General Agreement on Trade in Services, in Uruguay Round Final Act,
Dec. 15, 1993, art. XIX, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, GATT Doc. No. MTN/FA, 33 I.L.M. 441130 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS].
12. See MARKUS KRAJEWSKI, PUBLIC SERVICES AND THE SCOPE OF THE
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 3 (2001) (noting that civil society
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the progressive liberalization of trade in services concerns some
groups because these efforts could potentially impact governments'
provision of traditional public services. 13 Interference with public
services is generally considered the "third rail" of politics in many
national and regional political contexts.
14
In participating in GATS negotiations, the United States faces
political and legal difficulties in both the domestic and international
arenas that could threaten the process internally and damage the
groups fear the potential impact of GATS on local, regional, and national policies
pertaining to economic and social development, environmental protection and even
cultural objectives), available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/PublicServicesScope.pdf (last visited Oct. 13,
2003). The WTO's political vulnerabilities were graphically displayed during the
1999 talks in Seattle, Washington when violent protests erupted, causing the WTO
to suspend negotiations. Id.; see also Press Release, World Trade Organization, It
is Vitals to Maintain and Consolidate what has Already Been Achieved (Dec. 7,
1999) (providing insight into WTO negotiators' disappointment about the
suspension of talks due to the violent protests and their attempt to dilute the public
relations disaster by pointing out that there have been other occasions when talks
have been suspended, and the WTO continued to function), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres99-e/prl6Oe.htm#l (last visited Oct. 13,
2003); see also David Postman & Mike Carter, Police Switch to New Strategy:
They Say Rough Protest Caught Them Off Guard, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at
Al (describing the massive protests in Seattle, Washington during the WTO talks
and the police measures to limit activists' and opportunists' violent behaviors);
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., GATS: THE CASE FOR OPEN SERVICES
MARKETS 13 (2002) [hereinafter ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.]
(arguing that the GATS is in the center of the trade controversy because services
impact a broad range of interests, triggering the broad opposition of many different
civil society groups).
13. See KRAJEWSKJ, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that "public services" usually
include communications, transportation, postal and other crucial services, and that
these areas could be subject to GATS restrictions).
14. See Rob Norton, Rough Around the Edges; Why Does Paul O'Neill Make
People So Hot Under the Collar?, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2001, at B1 (describing
the widespread shock at then Treasury Secretary O'Neil's unusual and politically
dangerous statement belittling the importance of Social Security, a crucial
government service that supports a substantial portion of the American
population); see also Clifford Krauss, Long Lines Mar Canada's Low Cost
Healthcare, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at A3 (reporting that the Canadian
Parliament and private influences have traditionally avoided altering Canadian
public health services). The expression "third rail" of politics alludes to the subway
rail in most subway systems that is electrified, rendering it dangerous. Id.
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process globally. 5 GATS' broad scope will affect many sectors of
the U.S. economy, which has sparked the interest of various affected
communities and complicated negotiators' efforts.16 Of the many
contentious issues that have emerged as domestic political hotspots,
the provision of postal services through the United Stated Postal
Service ("USPS"), presents unique challenges in the GATS context. 7
Currently USPS enjoys a special legal status" in American law as a
15. See Symposium, Why Does the World Hate America? (A Symposium Of
Views), 17 INT'L ECON. 24 (2003) (discussing the international perceptions of
American foreign policy that threaten the U.S. international political position).
16. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Trade in Services: How It Will
Affect Teamsters Members (outlining the International Brotherhood of Teamsters'
opposition to GATS and arguing that the current protections for workers, including
those concerning workplace safety, would be vulnerable to legal attack), at
http://www.teamster.org/govemmt/tradeissues/gats/tradeinservices.htm (last
visited Oct. 13, 2003); see also GATSwatch, Stop the GATS Attack (providing an
overview of international civil society objections to GATS and listing
organizations throughout the world that object to GATS), at
http://www.gatswatch.org/StopGATS.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
17. See discussion infra Part II (explaining why GATS will apply to the USPS
and highlighting key problems with USPS' operations complying with GATS).
18. See Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-375, §§ 101(a), 401,
84 Stat. 719, 722-23, 39 U.S.C.A. § 101(a) and § 401 (West 2003) (describing the
responsibilities of USPS to provide services on behalf of the U.S. government and
granting the authority to the USPS to exercise unique government powers
including the privilege of exercising the right of eminent domain); see also Press
Release, White House, Statement by the Press Secretary (Dec. 11, 2002)
(announcing the establishment of a bipartisan commission to examine challenges
to the USPS and noting that the $900 billion domestic mail industry effects all
Americans), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021211-1.html (last visited
Oct. 13, 2003). Although it appears that the USPS will continue to enjoy a special
relationship with the U.S. government, the extent of the USPS' elevated legal
status is currently under attack. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE USPS,
EMBRACING THE FUTURE: MAKING THE TOUGH CHOICES TO PRESERVE UNIVERSAL
MAIL SERVICE ix-xix (July 31, 2003) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]
(discussing the need for reform of USPS and summarizing new models for USPS'
organizational structure, including privatization), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/domestic-finance/usps/pdf/freport.pdf (last visited
Oct. 15, 2003); see also Exec. Order No. 13,278, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,671 (Dec. 11,
2002) (establishing the Presidential Commission and specifically ordering the
Commission to review USPS' structure and organization and provide
recommendations for keeping the USPS efficient and sustainable), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-
finance/usps/pdf/postalCommissionExecutiveOrder.pdf (last visited Oct. 15,
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result of its standing as a government entity, and its statutory
monopoly in the areas of first-class and standard mail delivery, and
access to customers' mailboxes. 9 This 225 year-old institution
enjoys these legal benefits because it provides universal postal
2003); Mike Causey, Bush Administration is Eager to Privatize Federal Jobs,
WASH. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at A5 (commenting on the Bush administration's
perceived drive to privatize jobs in federal agencies). Also, USPS' recent legal
problems have highlighted that its ever expanding activities have potentially
diluted its special legal protections under law. Compare Flamingo Indus. (USA)
Ltd. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 302 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct.
2215 (May 27, 2003) (No. 02-1290) (considering the question of whether USPS is
vulnerable to suit under domestic anti-trust laws that utilize the designation of a
"person" now that USPS has arguably extended itself beyond its Congressionally
required mandate), with Sea-Land Serv. Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d 243, 245-46
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982) (holding that the United States
and its instrumentalities were not "persons" within the meaning of federal anti-
trust law). See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2-4, USPS v. Flamingo Indus.
(U.S.A) Ltd., 2003 WL 22330883 (No. 02-1290) (discussing the traditionally
privileged position of the USPS).
19. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1699 (2003) (restricting the right to deliver mail to
the USPS and providing for criminal sanctions); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1725 (2003)
(limiting mailbox use to USPS employees and sanctioning punishment for
unauthorized use); 39 U.S.C. § 601-606 (2003) (providing for instances when it is
legal to carry letters outside the mail and establishing the police authority of the
USPS); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
128 (1981) (upholding USPS' right of exclusive access to customer mailboxes and
finding that customers agreed to this restriction in exchange for postal service);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, POSTAL SERVICE REFORM: ISSUES RELEVANT TO
CHANGING RESTRICTIONS ON PRIVATE LETTER DELIVERY 10 (Sept. 1996)
[hereinafter CHANGING RESTRICTIONS] (analyzing the evolution of the 1934
statutory restrictions on mailbox access and noting that Congress sought to prevent
the loss of postal revenues in passing these limitations), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress= 162.140.64.21 &filename=gg96129b.pdf&directory=/dis
kb/wais/data/gao (last visited Oct. 14, 2003); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S.
POSTAL SERVICE: INFORMATION ABOUT RESTRICTIONS ON MAILBOX ACCESS 21
(May 1997) [hereinafter MAILBOX ACCESS] (emphasizing that USPS has used its
authority to create Postal Regulations to expand the mailbox restriction, making it
applicable to items hanging from mailboxes), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress= 162.140.64.21 &filename=gg97085.pdf&directory=/disk
b/wais/data/gao (last visited Oct. 22, 2003); Rick Geddes, Opportunities for
Anticompetitive Behavior in Postal Services, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y
RESEARCH, June 1, 2003 (analyzing the USPS statutory monopoly and describing
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services that have historically played a significant role in promoting
national unity and serving important social functions.2" The USPS'
unique legal, cultural, and social status, 21 and the international
precedent related to the compliance of domestic postal services with
international trade agreements make the problem of USPS'
compliance with GATS.very complicated.22 This issue increases the
potential for domestic outcry that could possibly reignite hostilities
for international trade organizations in a manner most graphically
depicted during the WTO's 1999 Seattle talks2
This Comment considers the challenges U.S. policymakers face in
reforming the USPS while seeking to balance both American
obligations under the evolving GATS and domestic statutory and
social responsibilities.24 Part I discusses the GATS agreement and
highlights language in the agreement that is difficult to apply to
20. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 1, 15 (praising the 225 year old
institution for its contributions to American society and noting its cultural
importance).
21. See id. at 1 (highlighting the important role the USPS has played in
promoting national unity and facilitating the exchange of ideas and information);
see also Nat'l Postal Museum, The Post and the Press (identifying the important
role the USPS played in cultivating the active American newspaper media), at
http://www.postalmuseum.si.edu/exhibits/2a2_postandpress.html (last visited Oct.
13, 2003). Americans often view the USPS as crucial to American First
Amendment rights, which is an undeniably important component of the American
identity. Id.; see also Gary B. Pruitt, The Newspaper Association of America,
Testimony Before The President's Commission on the United States Postal Service
3-4 (Apr. 4, 2003) (describing the centuries old relationship between the USPS and
the newspaper industry and noting the crucial importance of USPS' role in
sustaining the forum for expressing American freedoms), at
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/domestic-finance/usps/testimony-docs/Pruitt.pdf
(last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
22. See discussion infra Part I.E (outlining the two major postal cases and
revealing the legal constraints on the national postal service's operations).
23. See KRAJEWSKI, supra note 12, at 3-4 (discussing the difficulties in
regulating services due to debate about definitions and the scope of the term
"services" and vocal opposition from local and regional groups concerned about
regulations); see also Neil King, Jr., Leading the News: E. U. Asks U.S. to Revise
Rules for Service Sector: Host of Regulations at Issue as Bush Seeks Freer Trade;
Alarm Likely at Local Level, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A3 (revealing the
European Union's displeasure with USPS' monopoly); Postman & Carter, supra
note 12 (describing the protests in Seattle, Washington during the WTO talks).
24. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (outlining the Comment's
main focus and arguments).
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national postal services.25 Part II examines the lessons of two major
international disputes regarding postal monopolies-the Deutsche
Post AG ("Deutsche Post") case in the European Union ("E.U."), and
the ongoing arbitration between the United Parcel Service ("UPS")
and Canada Post under the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA").26 Both of these examples are useful in identifying
potential problems within national postal systems that complicate
compliance with international competition laws. Part III analyzes
American obligations under GATS and under the current American
offer and argues that, based upon the issues presented in the cases of
Deutsche Post and Canada Post, USPS' express delivery service
operations are illegal. 28 This section also highlights specific
problems with USPS' operations that render it legally vulnerable
under the GATS. 29 Finally, Part IV recommends how the USPS can
manage its reforms to meet its international and domestic
obligations.3"
25. See discussion infra Part I (summarizing the GATS agreement and
highlighting contentious principles).
26. See discussion infra Part I.E (reviewing two major international postal
decisions regarding abuse of monopoly position for their value as precedent for
interpreting the GATS monopoly provisions and as potential examples of how the
WTO might review a challenge to USPS operations).
27. See id. (highlighting some of the common problems in national postal
system operations that have been found illegal under international agreements).
28. See discussion infra Part II (analyzing possible GATS implications for the
USPS in light of the U.S. offer and issues presented in the Deutsche Post and
Canada Post cases).
29. See discussion infra Part II.B (noting aspects of USPS' operations that
suggest it is abusing its monopoly powers, which constitutes an illegal behavior
under the GATS agreement).
30. See discussion infra Part II (applying analysis of the U.S. GATS offer and
solutions from the Deutsche Post litigation and analysis from the Canada Post
arbitration to discuss recommendations to remedy the USPS' potential legal
difficulties in complying with GATS).
2003] 439
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I. BACKGROUND
A. GATS: THE IMPORTANCE OF SERVICES AND SERVICE
AGREEMENTS
GATS, which entered into force in January 1995, 31 represents a
unique effort to generate comprehensive reductions in the barriers to
trade32 in services on an unprecedented scale 33 that could have
extraordinary implications for the world economy. 34 Although
authorities caution thatthe very nature of services renders it difficult
to quantify their economic importance, World Bank economists
believe that services are the fastest growing component of the
31. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements,
Services: Rules for Growth and Investment (summarizing the major features of the
GATS agreement and advancing that its implementation in January 1995
represents the landmark achievement of the Uruguay Round), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/agrm6_e.htm (last visited Oct.
14, 2003).
32. See World Trade Organization, The Case for Open Trade [hereinafter Case
for Open Trade] (outlining the most commonly cited arguments in support for free
trade), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tife/fact3_e.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2003); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra
note 12, at 17-21 (rebutting arguments against free trade by providing statistical
data about unrealized economic potential and possible economic gains). David
Ricardo's theories addressing competitive advantage and the inefficiencies of
protectionism guide economists in pursuing the goal of free trade that they believe
will produce greater economic benefits. See Case for Open Trade, supra (providing
an overview of major WTO arguments for free trade and highlighting David
Ricardo's economic analysis).
33. See generally Government of Canada Competition Bureau, Competition
Policy Considerations in the GATS Negotiations (explaining the GATS
implications from the perspective of the Canadian government in order to solicit
the opinions of the Canadian business sector about proposed Canadian negotiating
positions and indicating that the Canadian government believes that the GATS
agreement represents an extraordinary opportunity to pursue open service
markets), at http://cb-bc.gc.ca/epic/intemet/incb-
bc.nsf/vwGeneratedlnterE/ct02192e.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
34. See The World Bank Group, Services - Trade Services in the World




00.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003); see also infra notes 35-37 and accompanying
text (detailing estimates of importance of services in the global economy).
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international economy in the last fifteen years, accounting for about
sixty to seventy percent of production and employment in developed
countries and generating over $1.3 trillion in 1999. 31 Remarkably,
economists assume that the economic importance of services will
only continue to grow because the dual impacts of the growing
feasibility of trade in services, due to improvements in technology,
and a growing trend towards liberalization will serve as an impetus
for increased service trade.36 As a result, policy makers cannot
overstate the importance of the GATS agreement.37
B. THE PROCESS AND FRAMEWORK OF THE GATS AGREEMENT
GATS remains a work in progress because its framers developed it
as a dynamic agreement that requires signatories to adopt certain
general principles and then negotiate specific commitments for the
gradual liberalization of their service economies.38 It has three major
elements: the framework for general obligations for services trade,
annexes on specific sectors, and the schedules of WTO members'
35. See The World Bank Group, supra note 34 (noting these statistics, which
the World Bank believes might be undervalued even at these levels, and
mentioning that the fastest growing sectors are in telecommunications, health, and
finance services); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note
12, at 13 (providing the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) estimates regarding this economic activity). The OECD
asserts that trade in services account for seventy percent of production and
employment in its member area. Id.
36. See The World Bank Group, supra note 34 (advancing World Bank
economists' major explanations for the recent increases in service trade).
37. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (highlighting the financial
data that demonstrates the importance of services and emphasizing that this
importance will continue to grow).
38. See GATS, supra note 11, art. XIX, (detailing the framework for the
gradual negotiations of specific commitments geared toward generating
progressive liberalization), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/26-gats_01_e.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2003); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-COOPERATION AND DEV., supra note 12, at 10
(discussing the flexible liberalization approach of the GATS agreement); J. Steven
Jarreau, Interpreting the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the WTO
Instruments Relevant to the International Trade in Financial Services: The
Lawyer's Perspective, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1, 31-35 (1999) (discussing
the framework of the GATS agreement and noting that the framework's general
principles and rules apply to all trade in services).
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commitments.39 Having adopted the agreements' principles, the
signatory governments are currently abiding by the Uruguay Round's
agenda that calls for further negotiations."n
Negotiations commenced on January 1, 2000, to facilitate specific
commitments to liberalize Members' service sectors in the request-
offer proceedings when Members can request access to others'
economies and offer access to their own.4' Leaders envisioned this
voluntary process of progressive liberalization as a means to ensure
that countries, particularly developing countries, could exercise
substantial control over the rate of liberalization.42 Members took the
concrete step of setting deadlines for proposals at the Doha, Qatar
meeting to ensure the continued progress of the negotiations. 43 As a
result, GATS negotiators remain on course to make steady, albeit
slow, progress toward the ultimate aims of GATS beyond the general
principles previously adopted."
39. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-COOPERATION AND DEV., supra note 12, at 10
(providing analysis of the GATS framework).
40. See id. at 13 (describing the current process of securing Member
commitments).
41. See id. at 10 (noting that GATS permits Members to select the sectors,
supply modes and regulatory conditions in which to make its commitments); see
also World Trade Organization, The New Negotiations (supplying an overview of
the specific commitment process, including the most recent offer submissions to
the WTO), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/snegs_e.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2003).
42. See GATS, supra note 11, part IV (outlining the process of progressive
liberalization of Members' service economies); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
COOPERATION AND DEV., supra note 12, at 10 (noting that the "progressive,
voluntary nature of liberalization" renders the GATS the most "development-
friendly" agreement of the Uruguay Round Agreements).
43. See World Trade Organization, Doha 4th Ministerial Declaration,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I (Nov. 20, 2001) (committing members to completing the
request and offer phase by March 31, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min0l_e/mindecle.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2003).
44. See Trading Futures, supra note 9 (noting that the GATS negotiations are
continuing and making slow but positive progress); see also World Trade
Organization, Africa Urges End to Cotton Subsidies; Supachai Warns "Time
Running Out" on Cancun Preparations, Opening Remarks of TNC Chairman (June
10, 2003) (noting that the negotiators have made progress in crucial areas and also
stressing the need for further progress before the Cancun Conference), at
http://www.wto.org/english/news e/news03_e/tnc-openremarks-10juneO3_e.htm
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C. THE GATS AGREEMENT: BASIC SCOPE
Article I defines GATS' scope as governing "measures by
Members affecting trade in services. ' 45 The definition of "services,"
in Article 1:3, however, is less clear, sparking some controversy.46
Article 1:3 provides that "services" means any service except those
supplied "in the exercise of government authority."47 In order to
apply the government authority exception, the government must
supply the service "neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition
(last visited Oct. 13, 2003); Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Real Losers are the Poor,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 18, 2003, (blaming the inability of the WTO to achieve
its objectives in Cancun on the lack of political will and the Members' failure to
disclose true negotiation positions in the early stages of negotiations, but remaining
hopeful that the WTO will achieve its aims after Members' recommitment to
success), available at
http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id = l 10287&owner-(IHT)&date=20030919132
938 (last visited Oct. 13, 2003); Jenny Davey & Russell Hotten, WTO Negotiations
End in Failure, TIMES (London), Sept. 15, 2003, at 19, (reporting on the collapse
of the most recent WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico and likening
this failure to the 1999 disastrous Seattle, Washington trade talks and noting that
the WTO publicly stated that this event was only a "setback" because the
member's had reconfirmed the Doha declarations and the General Council will
meet again before December 15, 2003); World Trade Organization, Day 5:
Conference Ends Without Consensus (summarizing the final day of the conference
and highlighting Chairperson Luis Ernesto Derbez's optimism that the WTO will
ultimately achieve its goals), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min03_e/minO314sept-e.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2003); John Audley, The Cancun Circus: A Worn Out Act by Rich
Nations, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 18, 2003 (analyzing the results of the Cancun
conference and highlighting the major factors, including U.S. special domestic
interests, that contributed to the failure of the talks), available at
http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id= 110274&owner=(IHT)&date=20030919132
938 (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
45. See GATS, supra note 11, arts. 1: 1 & 1:2 (describing four modes that define
trade in services). Specifically, these modes define trade in services as the supply
of a service:
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other member;
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other
Member; (c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial
presence in the territory of any other Member; (d) by a service supplier of one
Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of
any other Member. Id.
46. See KRAJEWSKI, supra note 12 at 4, 16, 18 (describing the ambiguities that
plague observers' efforts to interpret the scope of the GATS agreement).
47. GATS, supra note 11, art. 1:3 (defining services).
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with one or more service suppliers," a crucial provision which the
GATS framers did not clarify.4 8 Thus, this seemingly narrow
approach does not appear to make any concessions for hybrid or
mixed private and public entities that provide essential social
services, which are common mediums governments use to subsidize
their costs for caring for citizens.4 9 Commentators assert that the
extent of the confusion about these basic principles that define the
essence of GATS is so widespread that WTO Members do not even
agree on the definitions of these elements.50
Thus, as the WTO struggles with the negotiations pertaining to
specific members' commitments and schedules for liberalizing their
service sectors, these discussions might be premature, as more
fundamental issues remain unresolved.5" Varied understandings of
the scope of the GATS could serve to complicate further negotiations
as the specific offers and requests will likely prompt debate about
these more basic elements of the agreement.52
D. NATIONAL POSTAL SERVICES DEBATE: ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
OF A POOR FOUNDATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Regardless of whether a Member has included postal services in
its commitment schedules, a finding that the national postal service is
not a protected "exercise of governmental authority"5 3 will trigger
48. See id. (stating that services supplied in the exercise of governmental
authority are neither supplied on a commercial basis, nor in competition with other
service suppliers).
49. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (providing the strict language of
the GATS exception); see also discussion infra Part II.A.1 (analyzing USPS and
demonstrating the difficulties associated with interpreting the GATS provision and
applying it to national postal services).
50. See KRAJEWSKI, supra note 12, at 6 (examining the WTO Secretariat and
WTO Members' conditional and uncertain language in discussing what these
provisions require and illustrating the general uncertainty that exists regarding
interpretation of the provision).
51. See discussion infra Part I.D (describing some of the difficulties in reaching
agreements because the member governments continue to argue about basic
definitional and other fundamental issues).
52. See id. (exploring the difficulties associated with interpreting the GATS
agreement).
53. GATS, supra note 11, art. 1.3.
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general GATS obligations, including those under Article VIII
concerning "Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers.15 4 This
provision obligates Members to monitor monopoly service providers
to ensure that their activities comply with other GATS principles
under Article 155 and the Member's specific commitments.
56
Observers expect to see the application of these provisions to postal
systems because these systems are losing their government service
characteristics as they venture into the competitive markets with the
benefits of a statutory monopoly, or receive such substantial
54. See id. art. 1:3 (providing that GATS governs services outside of
government authority); see also id. art. VIII (outlining GATS guidelines for
monopolies and exclusive service providers).
55. See id. art. II (detailing Most Favored Nation language and commitments).
Article II contains the commitments to Most Favored Nation Treatment. Id.; see
also id. art. 11:1 (stating that "[w]ith respect to any measure covered by this
Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to
services and service suppliers of any other Member, treatment no less favourable
than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country");
Alessandra Perrazzelli & Paolo R. Vergano, Terminal Dues Under the UPU
Convention and the GA TS: An Overview of the Rules and of Their Compatibility,
23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 736, 737-51 (2000) (explaining most favored nation
treatment and discussing Universal Post Union ("UPU") terminal dues and
potential difficulties in maintaining the system under the GATS' most favored
nation provisions). Commentators have noted that in instances where Article II
guarantees are applied to postal services, the global arrangement that postal
operators have developed under the auspices of the UPU may prove to be a
violation of the GATS Most Favored Nation Treatment. Id. Despite the GATS
apparent sensitivity to the plight of developing countries, the GATS language may
render the UPU terminal dues system, which are a set of agreements negotiated
between governments to recoup the costs of delivering international mail,
unworkable. Id. Under the UPU Conventions, developing countries receive
preferential treatment in deference to the varied cost structures of many delivery
areas and expertise, and such treatment could violate the GATS Most Favored
Nation Treatment principles. Id. GATS might also similarly jeopardize postal
operators' significant discretion in preventing commercial re-mailers from abusing
the preferential treatment provisions. Id.; see also Scott Sinclair, Remarks Prepared
for: Universal Postal Union Seminar, "The GATS Implications for Postal
Services," [hereinafter Sinclair GATS Remarks] (cautioning that GATS could limit
national postal systems from continuing certain aspects of the UPU system)
available at http://www.upu.int/relations-withwto/seminarscottsinclair.pdf
(last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
56. See GATS, supra note 11, art. VIII: 1 (requiring Members to "ensure that
any monopoly supplier provider of a service in its territory does not, in the supply
of the monopoly service in the relevant market, act in a manner inconsistent with
that Member's obligations under Article II and specific commitments").
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subsidies with which a private service provider would be unable to
compete.57 Despite the apparent relevance of these provisions to
national postal systems, the GATS text does not provide guidance
about how to determine what are acceptable postal activities, nor
does it clarify what possible abuses could fall under these Article
VIII regulations.58
In order to facilitate negotiations and comparison of Members'
schedules, the GATS Service Sectoral Classification List, which
guides the negotiations, assigns postal and courier services to the
communications sector.59 For clarification purposes, negotiators have
57. See Mary S. Elcano & Anthony Alverno, Reform in the Universal Postal
Union and the World Trade Organization, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN POSTAL
REFORM 293, 303 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 2001) ("Many
public postal operators have legal or de facto monopolies over certain types of
reserved services, such as the carriage of letters. Thus, to the extent these operators
are also participants in competitive markets, they could face allegations of abuse of
monopoly position.") The GATS agreement is explicit in covering both natural and
statutory monopolies. See GATS, supra note 11, art. VIII:5 (noting that the Article
provisions will apply to cases of exclusive service suppliers who "formally or in
effect" create a monopoly).
58. See Sinclair GATS Remarks, supra note 55 (highlighting the uncertainties
due to language ambiguities and the lack of definitions of crucial terms
surrounding compliance with GATS Article VIII provisions about monopolies).
59. See WTO Secretariat, Services Sectoral Classification List,
MTN.GNS/W/120 (July 10, 1991) [hereinafter SSCL] (outlining the key sectors
and their representative services), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/mtn-gns-w 120_e.doc (last visited
Oct. 15, 2003); see also World Trade Organization, GATS: Specific Commitments
(explaining that the sector and sub-sector commitments are listed in member
schedules according to the Sectoral Classification List in order to facilitate
comparison and negotiations), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/eol/e/wto06/wto6_27.htm (last
visited Oct. 13, 2003). However, the WTO Secretariat believes that this
designation is outdated. See World Trade Organization Secretariat, Postal and
Courier Services: Background Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/39 (June 12, 1998)
(explaining that this listing is based on in the outdated assumption that postal and
telecom services are offered by a single state monopoly), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/serv-e/w39.doc (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
Reform of these listings may become a reality as observers have positively reacted
to the European Union Commission's proposed new system of classification. See
also Hilke Smit, GA TS and the Postal Sector: The Next Round of Negotiations, in
FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN POSTAL REFORM 309, 315 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R.
Kleindorfer eds., 2001) (analyzing the weaknesses in the current classification of
the services scheme).
[19:431
2003] US. GA TS OFFER THREA TENS USPS 447
cross-referenced the GATS Service Sectoral Classification List to the
United Nations Central Product Classification ("UNCPC").6 ° While
the UNCPC assists in providing some indication as to what
comprises "postal services, '61 the problem of determining the extent
of GATS regulation of postal services remains acute when
considered in light of the "government authority" exemption of
GATS, and the wide range of communication services national postal
systems now offer.62 Due to the difficulties in defining the scope of
GATS over postal services, some commentators have proposed an
individualized analysis of each Member's postal system to determine
the extent of the system's service as a vehicle to exercise government
authority even before attempting to gauge possible violations or
abuse of monopoly positions.63
E. MAJOR INTERNATIONAL POSTAL DISPUTES
As a result of the vagueness in the GATS agreement, observers
have suggested examining major cases involving postal monopolies
and similar provisions in international law in order to identify more
conclusively the possible difficulties for USPS compliance with
60. See SSCL, supra note 59 (cross-referencing SSCL sectors and sub-sectors
to the corresponding United Nations Central Product Classification (CPC)).
61. See United Nations Statistics Division, Central Product Classification
Version 1.1, Series M. No. 77, ST/ESA/STAT/SER:M!77/Ver. 1.1. (2002) UNCPC
(Series M. No. 77, 1991) (clarifying that generally postal services related to letters,
consisting of pick-up, transport and delivery services, parcels, counter-services and
other postal services, including mailbox rental among others, are considered
"postal services"), available at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=16&Lg=l (last visited Oct. 13,
2003).
62. See Sinclair GATS Remarks, supra note 55 (commenting on the challenges
of understanding the potential impact of GATS on national postal services in light
of the vague agreement and varied postal system structures); see also Daniel J.
Foucheaux, Jr., USPS, Report on Non-postal Initiatives (revealing several USPS
business activities that are not part of USPS' Congressionally authorized postal
monopoly), available at http://www.nonprofitmailers.org/news/nonpostal.pdf (last
visited Oct. 15, 2003). For example, the report notes that USPS has developed a
number of non-postal services including electronic bill paying services and phone
cards in addition to its parcel services that are not included in the statutory
monopoly. Id. at 4-13.
63. See Sinclair GATS Remarks, supra note 55 (describing the possible need
for scrutiny of the activities of each government in terms of the provision of postal
services).
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GATS. 64 This urgent need for USPS reform65 to meet international
standards is evident in the signals of the European Union's
dissatisfaction with the current USPS monopoly because it suggests
that the European Union might be eager to exploit any legal
vulnerability USPS might encounter under the GATS agreement.66
Both the Deutsche Post case and the Canada Post case are
informative in formulating USPS reforms.67
1. The Deutsche Post Case
a. Lessons from the Deutsche Post Case
Prior to the March 2001 European Commission ("E.C.") decision
regarding the Deutsche Post monopoly and USPS' claims, USPS and
Deutsche Post's operations seemed extremely similar.68 In addition to
the operational similarities, the relevant regulation at issue in the
Deutsche Post case, Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty, resembles the
GATS monopoly regulations because Article 82 is relatively broad
64. See id. (highlighting the ongoing UPS v. Canada Post NAFTA case as a
possible tool to identify needed reforms); see also Canadian Union of Postal
Workers, The GATS and Public Postal Services (mentioning the NAFTA
arbitration as an example for Canadian officials to monitor to ensure Canada Post's
compliance with GATS), available at
http://www.cupw.ca/pages/document-eng.php?DocID=281 (last visited Oct. 15,
2003).
65. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 159 (emphasizing the need for
postal reform in order to ensure the continued operations of USPS).
66. See King, supra note 23 (citing the European Union's request for USPS to
give up its monopoly over first class mail delivery and liberalize other economic
sectors). By virtue of the fact that the United States is a GATS signatory, the E.U.
has additional legal avenues to attack USPS' operations, as evidenced in its right to
monitor USPS at all times to ensure that the United States is meeting its
obligations under basic GATS principles and complying with the agreement. See
GATS, supra note 11, pmbl. & art. VIII (setting forth the basic principles of GATS
and requiring monopolies to abide by the general framework of the agreement).
67. See discussion infra Part II (explaining how the Deutsche Post case and the
Canada Post arbitration highlight some important issues to consider in evaluating
USPS' compliance with GATS).
68. See David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for
State-Owned Enterprises, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y RESEARCH 1-4
(noting the similar mail monopoly rights of the two national postal systems and
their similar competitors outside of their respective letter monopolies), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20021215-pssida0212.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
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and vague with scant case law regarding the subject.69 Thus, analysis
of Deutsche Post's activities could prove useful in determining how
an international body would define postal monopoly abuses.70 The
experience of Deutsche Post and the Commission's solutions to its
abusive monopoly tactics might provide guidelines for USPS'
potential GATS issues. 1
69. See John Temple Lang & Robert O'Donoghue, Defining Legitimate
Competition: How to Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82 E. C., 26 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 83, 83-84 (2002) (noting that "very little effort" has been made to
illuminate the meaning of Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty and designating prohibited
behaviors); see also discussion supra Part I (explaining that there are some
questions as to the meaning of the plain language of GATS and questions as to its
applications to monopolies).
70. See Sappington & Sidak, supra note 68, at 4-6, 11-12, (suggesting that the
issues and solutions in the Deutsche Post case could provide a valuable precedent
for the NAFTA arbitration involving Canada Post and UPS); see also SCOTT
SINCLAIR, THE GATS AND CANADIAN POSTAL SERVICES 27-29 (2001) (suggesting
that Canada Post's NAFTA arbitration experience provides lessons for
understanding how GATS might be applied to postal operations), available at
http://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/gatsandpostalservices.pdf (last
visited Oct. 15, 2003).
71. See Case COMP/35.141- Deutsche Post AG, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 27, para. 3
[hereinafter Deutsche Post Decision] (indicating that UPS could bring a claim
against Deutsche Post under Article 3 of Regulation No. 17 in July 1994),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l_125/1_12520010505en00270044.pdf (last visited Oct. 24,
2003). The European Commission had jurisdiction over this case because the
Federal Republic of Germany is a member of the E.U., and under E.U. laws,
private companies, such as UPS, operating in the E.U. territory can bring legal
action against another entity operating in E.U. territory. Id. paras. 3, 25 & 30; see
also Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust Proceedings in Postal Sector
Result in Deutsche Post Separating Competitive Parcel Services from Letter
Monopoly (Mar. 20, 2001) (summarizing briefly UPS' standing as an active
operator in the parcel business in Germany), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/01/4191
0IRAPID&lg=EN (last visited Oct. 13, 2003). As the case was decided according
to E.U. competition law, this example does not exactly mirror USPS' situation, but
many of the principles of the competition law in the E.U. and various other
international agreements are similar. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2
(noting that USPS' activities are similar to Deutsche Post's prior manner of
operations, found illegal by the E.C.).
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b. Background about Deutsche Post's Activities
Like USPS, Deutsche Post enjoyed a statutory monopoly over
letter services, but also endured the burden of fulfilling a public
service obligation.7" Deutsche Post's public service obligation
required it to provide services to the entire country, including
relatively unprofitable areas, and to ensure that it could handle peak
demand while providing a quality service.73 As a result of these
obligations to the German people, Deutsche Post maintained a
substantial infrastructure including sorting equipment, mail trucks,
and a large workforce.74 Among many activities that negatively
impacted fair competition in the German market, Deutsche Post
officials determined that the postal operator could utilize its legally
necessary infrastructure for delivery services other than their
statutorily required obligations.75  /
72. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, paras. 2, 8 (describing
Deutsche Post's monopoly and obligations under German law to provide certain
public services); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE:
KEY POSTAL TRANSFORMATION ISSUES, 4-5 (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter
TRANSFORMATION ISSUES] (noting that USPS' universal service obligation is not
expressly defined, but that USPS has interpreted it to include uniform postal rates
for all communities, six day postal delivery and universal access to post offices
among other services), at www.gao.gov/new.items/d03812t.pdf (last visited Nov.
7, 2003).
73. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, paras. 2, 8 (outlining Deutsche
Post's monopoly and its obligations under German law to provide certain public
services).
74. See id., paras. 8, 11-16 (describing Deutsche Post's infrastructure and
briefly commenting on the advantages of maintaining this massive network in
competition against private parcel delivery services); see also Lang &
O'Donoghue, supra note 69, at 152-56 (detailing Deutsche Post's responsibility to
maintain their infrastructure and the possibility that Deutsche Post could use its
infrastructure for other activities besides the letter monopoly tasks).
75. See Sappington & Sidak, supra note 68, at 12, 15-16 (noting that Deutsche
Post was using its trucks, personnel, and sorting centers required for its letter
monopoly obligations to provide other delivery services).
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c. UPS' Allegations
UPS successfully argued76 that Deutsche Post used its monopoly
profits to maintain a parcel delivery service that charged below cost
prices." This form of cross-subsidization is illegal under E.U.
competition law78 because it distorts competition in a manner that
policymakers have found harmful for consumers in the long-run.79
UPS also successfully asserted that Deutsche Post's fidelity rebate
scheme violated E.U. competition principles.80
d. The European Commission's Decision
The European Commission's analysis of Deutsche Post's activities
provided important clarifications of European competition law.8" The
Commission considered Deutsche Post's operations in light of E.C.
Treaty Article 82 restrictions that prohibit entities in a "dominant"
76. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, paras. 3, 4 (briefly stating the
relevant areas of UPS' claims against Deutsche Post and revealing that UPS'
operations were predominately in the business-to-business sector).
77. See id. art. 1:2 (finding that Deutsche Post's costs of supplying its mail
order parcel service exceeded its prices); see also Sappington & Sidak, supra note
68, at 16 (concluding that Deutsche Post's parcel services were not sustainable at
their former cost levels without the influx of cash and resources from the
monopoly services).
78. See CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, art. 82, Nov. 10, 1997, art. 82, O.J. (C 325) 33 (2002)
[hereinafter E.C. Treaty] (prohibiting firms with dominant market positions from
abusing their economic power), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/ECconsol.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
79. See Sappington & Sidak, supra note 68, at 12-16 (detailing the European
Commission's determination of the harmful effects in the markets adjacent to
Deutsche Post's mail monopoly, highlighting that the major disagreement was the
definition of cross-subsidization, and discussion of the European Commission's
understanding of what constituted cross-subsidization to Deutsche Post's
activities).
80. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, paras. 33-34 (finding that
Deutsche Post's fidelity rebate scheme violated Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty).
81. See Lang & O'Donoghue, supra note 69, at 84-85 (arguing that case law
and European legislation has inadequately articulated the contours of Article 82 of
the E.C. Treaty); see also Sappington & Sidak, supra note 68, at 7-9 (arguing that
the Deutsche Post decision does not represent an entirely new development in
European competition law because it merely extends themes in the 1991 AKZO
decision, which also dealt with a multi-product firm).
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economic position from behaving in an unfair manner.82 In applying
these provisions to postal operations for the first time, the
Commission indicated that government postal operations must
adhere to E.U. competition laws in offering an expansive
interpretation of the treaty, finding that "undertaking" includes
"enterprise[s] which offer services for remuneration."83
The E.C. substantially explored the structure of Deutsche Post's
operations and the impact of its statutory obligations in calculating
what were permissible and impermissible postal operations in light
of monopoly regulations that prohibit abuse of monopoly power.s4
E.C. case law provided the precedent that a fair interpretation of
Article 82 included prohibitions against multi-product firms, like
Deutsche Post, engaging in cross-subsidization.85 Noting that cross-
subsidization, a type of predatory pricing, "occurs where the earnings
from a given service do not suffice to cover the incremental costs of
providing that service and where there is another service or bundle of
services the earnings from which exceed the stand alone costs, 8 6 the
Commission endeavored to calculate whether Deutsche Post had
covered the incremental costs of the parcel service, while
82. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, para. 25 (noting the basis for
the applicability of Article 82 and the E.C.'s analysis); see also E.C. Treaty, supra
note 78, art. 82 (broadly describing the breadth of the prohibition on dominant
undertakings' that are incompatible with the common market prohibited actions).
83. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, para. 25 (demonstrating the
broad approach the Commission adopted with respect to the scope of Article 82 of
the E.C. Treaty by allowing this type of "undertaking" to qualify).
84. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text (describing the Commission's
analysis).
85. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, paras. 5-41 (exploring
Deutsche Post's operations and applying relevant economic theories in order to
gauge the legality of Deutsche Post's operations); see also Sappington & Sidak,
supra note 68, at 8-9 (explaining how this decision extended the AKZO Chemie
BV v. Commission test to account for unique postal system attributes).
86. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, para. 6 (defining cross-
subsidization and establishing the standards that the E.C. applied in reviewing
Deutsche Post's operations); see also Lang & O'Donoghue, supra note 69, at 150-
51 (outlining basic principles of cross-subsidization analysis).
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differentiating these costs from common fixed costs which are not
solely accrued from this parcel service.87
In order to conduct this analysis, the Commission scrutinized
every aspect of Deutsche Post's mail-order parcel service and
determined the extent of the operation's reliance on the statutorily
required mail facilities.88 As the Commission recognized that
Deutsche Post's public service obligation requires the maintenance
of a certain reserve capacity regardless of the demand, the
Commission did not attribute the common fixed costs of maintaining
the network to the parcel service costs, but it still required Deutsche
Post to show that the parcel service revenue covered the costs of
actually providing the service or utilizing the network. 9 Thus, the
Commission stressed the differences between a firm's "costs of
supply network capacity and its costs of supply network usage."90
Ultimately, the Commission demonstrated concern for consumers
and the overall state of fair competition in the market in striking the
balance of allowing Deutsche Post's mail order parcel service to
realize the benefits of the larger network, but refusing to condone
Deutsche Post's attempt to capitalize on its market dominance and
network in its fidelity rebate scheme and instances of predatory
pricing.91
87. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, paras. 11-24 (presenting the
Commission's relevant considerations and calculations).
88. See id., paras. 30-32 (examining the processes involved with the collection
of the parcels, sorting, long-distance transport, regional and local transport, and
delivery).
89. See id., paras. 8-10 (outlining the considerations for calculating the costs
associated with the parcel service while properly accounting for the costs arising
from Deutsche Post's statutory requirements).
90. See id., paras. 11-17 (finding that Deutsche Post's mail order parcel
services could use Deutsche Post's mail delivery resources without accounting
these fixed costs to the mail order parcel operations); see also Sappington & Sidak,
supra note 68, at 8-9 (highlighting some of the crucial bases for the Commission's
decision and explaining how this case contributed to the competition law in the
E.U. by extending the AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission test to encompass a
postal monopoly's unique situation when the law requires it to maintain a network
regardless of volume).
91. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, paras. 33-41 (examining
Deutsche Post's fidelity rebate system, allegations of predatory pricing, and
exploring the effects of Deutsche Post's behavior on the markets).
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2. The Canada Post Arbitration
a. Lessons from the Canada Post Arbitration
Although arbitration under NAFTA regulations in United Parcel
Services, Inc. v. the Government of Canada continues, the parties'
briefs and other legal analysis are useful in determining which postal
processes could be considered illegal under GATS.92 Like the GATS
articles, the NAFTA agreement prohibits abusive monopoly practices
and also expressly places the burden of monopoly regulation on the
national governments. 93
b. Background about Canada Post's Activities
Like other national postal carriers, Canada Post enjoys a special
relationship with the national government.94  Canada Post's
circumstances are unique because it is not a department of the
92. See Government of Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, Dispute Settlement, NAFTA - Chapter 11 Investment (stating
that UPS first filed suit in April 2000 and the arbitration proceedings are still in
progress), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/parcel-en.asp (last
visited Oct. 17, 2003); see also discussion supra Part I.E.2 and infra Part II.B
(summarizing Canada Post's operational practices that triggered the UPS
arbitration proceedings against the postal monopoly and highlighting that as these
same issues are evident in USPS' operations USPS will likely be vulnerable to
allegations that it abuses it monopoly resources under the GATS agreement).
93. Compare GATS, supra note 11, art. VIII (mandating that national
governments must regulate monopolies) with North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can. - Mex. - U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force
Jan. 1, 1993) [hereinafter NAFTA], arts. 1502, 1503 (requiring that national
governments monitor monopolies and prevent abuses of market dominance),
available at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/DefaultSite/legal/indexP-e.aspx?articleid= 165english/index.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2003); see also Scott Sinclair, The GATS and Postal Services:
Implications for Developing Countries, 3:2 CAN. CENTRE FOR POL'Y
ALTERNATIVES BRIEFING PAPER SERIES: TRADE AND INVESTMENT 4 (Oct. 2002)
(arguing that the NAFTA and GATS monopoly language is substantively similar),
available at http://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/brief3-2.pdf (last visited
Oct. 13, 2003).
94. See United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada,
Statement of Defense, para. 24, (Feb. 7, 2003), ICSID (W. Bank) [hereinafter
Statement of Defense] (noting that Canada Post is a Crown Corporation, which is
an entity of the Canadian government), available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/IntegratedStatement.pdf (last visited Oct. 13,
2003).
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government, but a Crown Corporation, meaning that it has some
independence from the government and pursues commercial
success.9 5 However, despite the appearance of autonomy, the
organizational structure ultimately reveals that the Canadian
government is the only shareholder, and it defines Canada Post's
mandate and public policy goals.96
The Crown Corporation status includes a statutory monopoly over
certain aspects of Canada Post's services.97 The Canadian Parliament
awarded Canada Post this monopoly to assist it in meeting its
Universal Service obligation, which requires Canada Post to provide
affordable national postal and parcel services throughout Canada. 98
Given that Canada's geographical size is the second largest in the
world, Canada Post's task of providing service is very demanding. 9
As a result, unlike monopoly rights awarded to other national postal
services, Canada Post's mandate is more expansive as it expressly
authorizes Canada Post to engage in operations that Canada Post
finds "necessary or incidental" to achieving its very difficult primary
goal of providing universal service.100 Thus, in addition to its
traditional letter and parcel delivery services, Canada Post uses its
post offices and equipment to provide a retail return service and
95. See id. paras. 22-23 (describing the concept of a Crown Corporation and
detailing its close relationship with the Canadian government while appearing to
be solely a commercial enterprise).
96. See id. (revealing the enormous power the Canadian government can
exercise over the operations of a national postal carrier).
97. See id. paras. 19-32 (summarizing the development of Canada Post and
noting that Canada Post enjoys monopoly rights in a manner similar to other
national postal services).
98. See id. paras. 25-33 (highlighting the Universal Service Obligation and
noting the challenges of meeting this obligation in a country as geographically
expansive such as Canada); see also SINCLAIR supra note 70, at 14-16 (analyzing
Canada Post's legal obligations).
99. See Statement of Defense supra note 94, para. 29 (noting that Canada is a
geographically large country with a modest population and a cold climate that
complicates the process of mail delivery); see also SINCLAIR, supra note 70
(noting that the size of Canada makes universal mail service very costly as
Canada's many rural areas are expensive to service).
100. See SINCLAIR, supra note 70 (arguing that this expansive language was
purposeful and necessary for Canada Post to operate efficiently and meet is
primary obligations).
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online bill payment service, which, according to the Government of
Canada, generate necessary revenue to maintain Canada Post's
immense mail network. 01
c. UPS' Allegations
UPS alleges that Canada Post's operations violate NAFTA's
provisions on monopolies and the more restrictive provisions on state
enterprises. 02 As WTO negotiators left the important term "abuse" in
the GATS agreement undefined, the examination of evidence
relating to UPS' specific grievances, which were framed according to
NAFTA language similar to GATS, can assist in predicting how the
WTO might define "abuse" in legal challenges to USPS under
GATS.
10 3
UPS' specific claims under Chapter 15 of NAFTA concerning
Canada Post's method of operations clarify some issues that arguably
could constitute "abuse" under GATS. °4 While NAFTA permits
signatory countries to maintain government monopolies," 5 it
101. See Statement of Defense, supra note 94, para. 33 (stating that Canada
Post's competitive operations are necessary to maintain its enormous postal
network); see also Canada Post, Products and Services (providing detailed
information about Canada Post's services), available at
http://www.canadapost.ca/personal/prodserv/default-e.asp (last visited Oct. 17,
2003).
102. See United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada,
Statement of Claim, paras. 11-44, (Apr. 19, 2000), ICSID (W. Bank) [hereinafter
Statement of Claim] (summarizing the claims of UPS under NAFTA regulations
against the government of Canada), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/state-claim.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
103. See Sinclair, supra note 93, at 4 (arguing that UPS' allegations about
Canada Post suggest possible appropriate challenges to national postal services
under GATS); see also SINCLAIR, supra note 70 (noting that UPS' same
strategies would probably be successful in a challenge to postal services under
GATS).
104. See Statement of Claim, supra note 102, paras. 21-39 (summarizing the
claims of UPS under NAFTA Chapter 15).
105. See NAFTA, supra note 93, art. 1505 (defining terms for NAFTA
competition regulations). NAFTA defines a monopoly as "an entity, including a
consortium or government agency, that in any relevant market in the territory of a
Party is designated as the sole provider or purchaser of a good or service, but does
not include an entity that has been granted an exclusive intellectual property right
solely by reason of such grant." Id.
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expressly requires parties to ensure that their monopolies and state
enterprises comply with the broad principles of free trade. °6 NAFTA
sets forth these principles elsewhere in the agreement, including in
Chapter Eleven on investment and Chapter Fourteen on financial
services, and lists a variety of prohibited actions under Article
1503(2).107 Under these provisions, UPS alleged that, with the full
knowledge of the Canadian government, 08 Canada Post subsidized
its e-commerce operations development costs with its revenues from
the letter monopoly, and that Canada Post engaged in predatory
pricing with respect to its Xpresspost and Priority courier services.l°9
UPS' claims regarding Canada Post's predatory pricing practices
suggest that Canada Post, like Deutsche Post, charges significantly
lower prices for some of its parcel services because Canada Post's
mail monopoly infrastructure minimizes costs for the operations."10
For example, UPS compared the costs to the consumer of sending a
parcel overnight with UPS and Canada Post's Xpresspost, finding
106. See id., art. 1503(2)-(3) (setting forth the requirements for state enterprises
to behave according to the agreement's broader goals for free trade and investment,
and also listing a range of prohibited activities in general terms).
107. See id. (listing the general free trade principles that apply to government
controlled firms). The effort to ensure that governments cannot avoid the NAFTA
restrictions by designating government-controlled firms to engage in anti-
competitive behavior adds substantial force to the agreement because it
encompasses explicit and implicit delegations of governmental authority, which
covers the range of relationships that national postal services have developed with
their governments. See Statement of Claim, supra note 102, para. 23 (stressing that
NAFTA's language defines state enterprises broadly, thus widening the scope of
NAFTA).
108. See Statement of Claim, supra note 102, para. 39 (arguing that the
Canadian government was aware of the unfair business practices of Canada Post,
and has not intervened or prevented the continuance of these practices, but has
instead supported Canada Post's behavior).
109. See id. para. 32 (summarizing two of UPS' key claims against Canada Post
under NAFTA Articles 1502(3)(d) and 1105).
110. See id. paras. 150(i) - (iii) (outlining the possible reasons for Canada Post's
ability to charge less than UPS for essentially the same service, concluding that
cross-subsidization is the only viable reason). UPS also noted that in 1996 the
Canada Post Mandate Review found that Canada Post is an "unfair competitor in
ways," and that its failure to properly allocate costs results in cross-subsidization,
which UPS alleges is an unfair practice. Id. paras. 154-65 (presenting the findings
of the Canada Post Mandate Review and reiterating that Canada Post's ability to
use its infrastructure constitutes an unfair cross-subsidization practice).
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that it costs customers $8.27 more to ship with UPS.' UPS alleges
that Canada Post can charge this lower price because Xpresspost's
prices do not reflect the real costs to the service provider since
Canada Post engages in cross-subsidization by carrying the parcels
over its extensive network developed for the monopoly services.'
12
UPS' Statement of Claim details how this cross-subsidization
pervades Canada Post's operations by examining how Canada Post's
Xpresspost services utilize Canada Post's monopoly infrastructure.' 13
Customers can leave Xpresspost packages at any Canada Post office
or place them in any Canada Post mailbox, which qualifies as a
monopoly benefit since use of the offices and mailboxes is exclusive
to Canada Post's operations.114 Because Canadian law solely
authorizes Canada Post employees to open the mailboxes, a Canada
Post employee picks up the Xpresspost package, takes it to a Canada
Post sorting center, and ensures that Xpresspost packages are sorted
with the monopoly letter products for air and ground
transportation.115 According to UPS, the use of the monopoly service
network for its non-monopoly products represents Canada Post's
111. See id. para. 149 (comparing costs of shipping a letter overnight from
Calgary to Winnipeg with UPS and Xpresspost).
112. See id. paras. 150 (iii), 154-59 (noting that Xpresspost uses a variety of
Canada Post facilities and services that Canada Post created for its monopoly
operations).
113. See notes 111-1 3 and accompanying text (demonstrating that Canada Post's
competitive services show significant reliance on its monopoly infrastructure).
114. See Statement of Claim, supra note 102, paras. 172-79 (stating that Canada
Post's retail locations handle monopoly and non-monopoly products, but the costs
of maintaining these retail locations are charged against the general operating costs
of the letter monopoly); see also "Mail Receptacle Regulations, Interpretation,"
C.R.C. [SOR/83-743], §§ 3-4 (providing national regulations about postal
mailboxes that limit their use to Canada Post's operations and grant Canada Post
the discretion to place the mailboxes in whichever locations Canada Post finds
beneficial to their operations), available at http://www.canlii.org/ca/regu/sor83-
743/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2003). Canada Post can capitalize on this benefit because
the Canadian government has granted it great latitude in placing the mailboxes
wherever Canada Post sees fit. Id.; see also Statement of Claim, supra note 102,
paras. 150, 160, 161 (noting that Xpresspost customers can use the mailboxes, and
Canada Post has broad discretion in determining where it can locate the mailboxes
that are exclusive to its use).
115. See Statement of Claim, supra note 102, paras. 150 (iii) & 160 (detailing
how an Xpresspost package travels through the Canada Post mail system in order
to document the extensive reliance of this service on the monopoly network).
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attempt to integrate the monopoly and competitive services to deflect
the high fixed costs in a manner that is contrary to general principles
of free trade under NAFTA. 116
II. ANALYSIS
A. U.S. OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO POSTAL SERVICES UNDER
GATS
Although the United States has not made any specific
commitments in the sector of postal services provided under the
USPS monopoly, GATS general principles will likely cover certain
USPS activities, and U.S. specific commitments will likely trigger
application of the Article VIII restrictions." 7  The specific
commitment that will prove most troublesome for the USPS is the
March 31, 2003 U.S. offer in the area of "express delivery
services. '  In offering liberalization in the sector of "express
delivery services," U.S. negotiators went beyond the WTO
classification list in order to differentiate these services from the
"postal services" category, which typically refers to services
116. See id. paras. 154-55 (describing the intentional attempt to present a
misleading representation of costs to the monopoly and competitive services). UPS
stressed that Canada Post uses its mail trucks to pick up packages and charges
these costs to Canada Post's general mail operations. Id. para. 67.
117. See GATS, supra note 11, art. VIII (requiring monopolies to abide by the
GATS general principles of Article II, which details the Most Favored Nation
obligations, and also requiring governments to ensure that the monopolies abide by
the Member's specific commitments within the monopoly sector, as well as in
other economic sectors that the monopoly may enter); see also infra note 124 and
accompanying text (explaining that some of USPS' services will qualify as
"express delivery services," which subjects USPS to the GATS obligations in this
sector); discussion infra Parts II.A. 1, II.A.2 (explaining that the U.S. offer will
require the USPS to comply with Article VIII obligations because the USPS cannot
use the government authority exception, and some of the USPS' operations would
be subject to the U.S. initial offer).
118. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE UNITED
STATES- INITIAL OFFER 45-46 [hereinafter INITIAL OFFER] (containing the U.S.
offer in the sector of "express delivery services"), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/services/2003-03-3 1 -consolidatedoffer.pdf (last
visited Sept. 22, 2003); see also discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the
implications of the U.S. offer for USPS).
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performed by postal administrations." 9 The Office of the United
States Trade Representative, the executive branch agency responsible
for negotiating American GATS commitments, 20 defined "express
delivery services" as the time sensitive delivery systems that use
advanced technologies to manage the delivery networks and
logistical problems and that provide such convenient services, such
as tracking a package and the ability of a sender to confirm
delivery. 2' This offer is relevant to USPS operations because it
offers such services outside its statutory monopoly in its Express
Mail, Priority Mail, Global Express Mail Guaranteed, and Global
Express services.'22
There are conflicting signals from the Office of the United States
Trade Representative about whether the U.S. government believes
that this provision would also cover national postal systems'
"express delivery services."1 23 Analysis of the GATS language,
119. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXPRESS
DELIVERY SERVICES 2 [hereinafter EXPRESS DELIVERY SERVICES] (explaining the
U.S. proposal to liberalize "express delivery services" and defining which services
the United States proposed to liberalize),
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/services/express.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2003); see
also SSCL, supra note 59 (organizing the list of services according to the UNCP);
see also supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (providing background
regarding the importance of the classification lists for organizing the negotiations).
120. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR's Role
(outlining the Office of the United States Trade Representative's duties and
highlighting its role in advising the U.S. President, coordinating all U.S. trade
policy and negotiating all matters pertaining to the WTO), at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-ustr/ustrrole.shtml (last visited Aug. 15, 2003).
121. See INITIAL OFFER, supra note 118, at 45-46 (describing the U.S. offer in
the sector of "express delivery services"); see also EXPRESS DELIVERY SERVICES,
supra note 119, at 2 (providing a more detailed description of the services U.S.
negotiators intended to include in their offer).
122. See U.S. Postal Service, Domestic Mailing (describing expedited domestic
delivery services that permit the customer to ship parcels quickly with the benefit
of some tracking and delivery confirmation services), at
http://www.usps.com/send/waystosendmail/senditwithintheus/domesticmailbillscar
dsandletters.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2003); see also U.S. Postal Service, Send
Mail (describing USPS' international mail services that allow the customer to track
the package and confirm delivery), at http://www.usps.com/global/sendmail.htm
(last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
123. Compare Bernard Ascher, Remarks at "The Classification Debate"
Universal Postal Union Council of Administration Project Team on WTO
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however, indicates that this GATS offer would apply to some USPS
operations, thus jeopardizing the USPS in a critical period of
reformation by calling into question the legality of its operations.
1 24
1. The GATS "Government Authority" Exception Does Not Protect
USPS Delivery Services
The U.S. government has indicated that the U.S. offers in the area
of "express delivery services" would not apply to services supplied
in the exercise of government authority, an exception allowed by the
GATS agreement. 25 This provision, however, will arguably not
protect USPS operations because the GATS language is very narrow
in determining what constitutes a valid exercise of government
Relations 1 (Oct. 23, 2002) (stating that these provisions would apply to both
private operators and any public postal administration that offers express services),
at http://www.upu.int/relations-withwto/seminarbernardascheren.pdf (last
visited Oct. 24, 2003), with INITIAL OFFER, supra note 118, at 45-46 (stressing that
express delivery service obligations would not apply to "services supplied in the
exercise of government authority" and suggesting that governments would "retain
the right to regulate to meet domestic policy objectives," which appears to provide
a loophole for national postal systems to provide express services for domestic
policy objectives, thus avoiding these regulations). See OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FREE TRADE IN SERVICES 2 (Mar. 31, 2003)
(noting that the proposal will not effect USPS' monopoly services, but also stating
that it would in "no way privatize any aspect of postal activity," suggesting that
USPS would not have to undertake the massive reforms that will be necessary to
avoid violating the GATS agreement under the current U.S. offer), at
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/services/2003-03-3 1 -services-tradefacts.pdf (last
visited Oct. 24, 2003); see also discussion infra Parts II.A. 1, II.A.2 (detailing why
USPS would violate the GATS under the current circumstances).
124. See UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 2002 THE NEED FOR
TRANSFORMATION 2-8 [hereinafter TRANSFORMATION PLAN] (noting USPS' need
for reform as evidence of substantial financial problems stemming from declining
first class mail volume and other market changes), available at
http://www.usps.com/strategicdirection/_pdf/TheNeedForTransformation.pdf (last
visited Sept. 22, 2003); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at viii
(summarizing the need for USPS to reform its operations as USPS' poor financial
state is jeopardizing both universal service and USPS' continued existence);
discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B (describing USPS' difficulties in complying with
the GATS agreement as a result of the U.S. offer regarding "express delivery
services").
125. See GATS, supra note 11, art. 1:3 (defining the "exercise of government
authority"); see also EXPRESS DELIVERY SERVICES, supra note 119, at 2 (stating
that the "express delivery services" would not pertain to those provided in the
exercise of government authority).
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authority for purposes of the exception. 2 6 Even in the event that the
USPS chooses to rely on its relationship with the U.S. government
and government assigned obligations to claim this exemption, the
USPS must still meet the requirement that it supplies the service
"neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more
service suppliers" in order to qualify for the GATS exception.' 2 ' As a
result, this language will not exempt the USPS' from compliance
with the GATS provisions and U.S. specific commitments regarding
"express delivery services."'28 First, the USPS fails the requirement
that its services not compete with the private sector, as its express
service activities are clearly in competition with major private parcel
handlers, including UPS and Federal Express ("FedEx").12 9 Second,
in light of the USPS' current "businesslike" operating strategy and its
goal of enhancing this focus on operating like a business, the
"commercial basis" clause may also preclude the USPS from using
the government exemption because its operations reflect a
126. See GATS, supra note 11, art. 1:3 (defining a service supplied "in the
exercise of government authority"); see also Perrazzelli & Vergano, supra 55, at
741-43 (noting the UPU's assessment that GATS will apply to postal services and
arguing that debate about GATS' application to UPU terminal dues will be more
difficult to resolve); Pub. Citizen, Save Our Services - Background, (warning that
many government services could be at risk of GATS restrictions because they
involve some "public/private mix or fee structure"), at
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/gats/articles.cfn?ID=9233 (last visited Oct. 24,
2003).
127. GATS, supra note 11, art. 1:3 (emphasis added).
128. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (describing the USPS' conflicts
with GATS); infra note 134 and accompanying text (reasoning that GATS would
likely cover USPS' activities).
129. See CHANGING RESTRICTIONS, supra note 19, at 34-40 (noting that USPS'
Express mail and priority mail products main private competitors include FedEx,
UPS, Airborne Express, Roadway Package System ("RPS") and DHL); see also
TRANSFORMATION PLAN, supra note 124, at 17 (acknowledging that UPS and
FedEx are USPS' competitors); Geddes, supra note 19, at I (stating that
"government postal firms usually offer overnight mail and package shipping
services in direct competition with private delivery companies"); Mike Eskew,
Chairman and CEO of UPS, Testimony Before The President's Commission on the
United States Postal Service 4 (Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Eskew Testimony]
(noting that UPS, FedEx and other private carriers compete with USPS), at
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/domestic-finance/usps/witness-
testimony.html#testimony0202003 (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). Mr. Eskew also
observed that "UPS is the only Fortune 100 company that has the U.S. government
as its primary competitor in its core line of business." Id.
462 [19:431
2003] U.S. GA TS OFFER THREA TENS USPS
commercial concentration.1 30 USPS is ultimately attempting to
conform its activities to the model of a "self-sustaining commercial
enterprise," which openly implies application of commercial
principles. 31
Some observers have suggested that even this basic analysis of the
USPS' strategies and market position may be unnecessary to prove
that USPS cannot qualify for the government authority exception.
32
For instance, academics and the E.C. decision in the Deutsche Post
case suggest that the WTO might consider the commercial basis
exclusion applicable to the USPS' service merely because it charges
its customers fees for its services.133 As a result, New Zealand
government authorities have stressed that as postal services charge.a
fee, "there would appear to be few examples of postal services
130. See GATS, supra note 11, art. 1:3 (limiting that the "government authority"
exception to services that are not supplied on a "commercial basis"); see also
TRANSFORMATION PLAN, supra note 124, at i, viii, x (summarizing USPS' gradual
transition into a more businesslike entity and advocating for further reorganization
in order to more closely resemble a commercial entity that can compete in the
changing markets).
131. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 32 (noting that the
Commission recommends that USPS "embrace proven business strategies" and
become a "self-sustaining commercial enterprise"); see also TRANSFORMATION
ISSUES, supra note 72, at 2 (emphasizing that Congress intended for USPS to
operate like a private, competitive business); TRANSFORMATION PLAN, supra note
124, at 65-69 (summarizing USPS' analysis that a "commercial government
enterprise model" would be most appropriate for USPS to fulfill its universal
service obligation while addressing its growing financial problems); Eskew
Testimony, supra note 129, at 2 (describing USPS' mission to provide a public
service and operate like a business).
132. See infra notes 133-134 and accompanying text (explaining the theory that
the USPS practice of charging for its services may be sufficient to preclude
application of the government authority exception to USPS).
133. See text accompanying note 83 (noting that the E.C. used similar reasoning
in finding that the weak standard of "enterprise[s] which offer services for
remuneration" sufficed to define an "undertaking" under European competition
law); see also SINCLAIR, supra note 70 (highlighting "commercial basis" is left
undefined in GATS and, as a result, the WTO could choose to apply the usual
standards for commercial activity of charging and accepting fees for a service to
postal operators' activities).
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supplied 'neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with one
or more service suppliers."
1 3 4
2. The Office of the United States Trade Representative's Offer
Regarding "Express Delivery Services " Will Trigger the Application
ofArticle VIII Provisions to USPS Operations and Potentially
Produce Costly Results Under the WTO Sanctions Regime
As a result of the U.S. offer and USPS' inability to benefit from a
government authority exception, another WTO Member could object
to the method of USPS' provision of "express delivery services"
because USPS, a monopoly, operates in a market outside its
monopoly that is arguably subject to a U.S. specific commitment.'
Specifically, the broadly defined "express delivery services" refers to
time sensitive delivery systems that use advanced technologies to
manage delivery networks, solve logistical problems, and provide
such services as package tracking and delivery confirmation.'36 These
express services are effected via USPS' Express Mail, Priority Mail,
Global Express Mail Guaranteed, and Global Express services.'37
Because USPS provides these committed services outside its
134. See Delegation of New Zealand, Communication from New Zealand:
Negotiating Proposal for Courier/Postal Services, S/CSS/W/1 15 (Nov. 6, 2001)
(communicating the opinions of the New Zealand government on GATS' powers
to regulate postal services), available at
http://www.esf.be/docs/GATS%20Negotiating%20proposals/New%2OZealand%2
OPostal-Courier%20Services.doc (last visited Oct. 24, 2003); see also Sinclair
GATS Remarks, supra note 55 (highlighting remarks from various governments
that dramatize the substantial lack of common understanding about essential
elements of the GATS and demonstrating Members' differences in opinion
regarding fundamental GATS issues such as its scope).
135. See infra discussion supra Part II.A (arguing that USPS operates in a
competitive environment that is subject to a U.S. specific commitment).
136. See INITIAL OFFER, supra note 118, at 45-46 (detailing the U.S. offer of
"express delivery services"); see also EXPRESS DELIVERY SERVICES, supra note
119, at 2 (describing the services U.S. negotiators intended to include in their offer
in greater detail).
137. See U.S. Postal Service, Domestic Mailing, supra note 122 (listing and
describing expedited domestic delivery services that offer customers the ability to
ship parcels quickly with the benefit of some tracking and delivery confirmation
services); see also U.S. Postal Service, Send Mail, supra note 122 (describing
USPS' international mail services with tracking and delivery confirmation
features).
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monopoly, the GATS agreement mandates that the United States
must abide by Article VIII:2 objectives. 38 These principles require
the United States to monitor USPS and other monopolies to ensure
that, when a monopoly enters other markets and competes outside its
monopoly sector in services that are subject to a specific
commitment, the monopoly does not abuse its monopoly power. 1
39
U.S. negotiators should not overlook the significance of an Article
VIII violation. 4 ° Potential GATS Article VIII violations are
enforceable under the Article XXIII Dispute Settlement and
Enforcement provisions, which authorize a complaining member to
resort to the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU")
procedures.' 4' Under the DSU provisions, the WTO can authorize
sanctions and compensation for losses due to a Member's
violations. 42 As prior U.S. experience with WTO enforcement
actions indicates, the dispute proceedings can spark trade wars and
result in substantial sanctions under WTO authority. 4 Thus, given
138. See GATS, supra note 11, art. VIII:2 (requiring that Members monitor
monopolies for compliance with GATS general principles and ensure that they do
not abuse their dominant market position when they enter into markets that
Members include in their schedule of commitments).
139. See id. (outlining each Member's obligations to monitor its monopolies
when they compete outside their monopoly sector for adherence to GATS Article
1I and to the Member's specific commitments).
140. See infra notes 141-144 and accompanying text (explaining the financial
and diplomatic significance of violating a WTO provision).
141. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2 (detailing the
provisions that will govern WTO violation proceedings), at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf (last visited Aug. Oct. 16,
2003).
142. See id. art. 22 (providing for compensation for Members' non-compliance).
143. See Brian Eriksen Noer, ETI Under Threat, ASSET FIN. INT'L., Dec. 2, 2002
(describing the chain of events that generated WTO backed sanctions against the
E.U. and the United States and stating that the E.U. launched a claim against the
United States as a reaction to the U.S. banana suit), available at 2002 WL
25701813; see also Heather Stewart, Trading Blows: The E.U. at Bay, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 17, 2002, at 26 (discussing various trade disputes between
international trading partners including the U.S. "banana war" with the E.U.),
available at 2002 WL 9514574. The United States brought a claim on behalf of
General Foods against the E.U. over the European quotas for Caribbean bananas,
charging that this behavior constituted banned preferential treatment of Caribbean
bananas that hurt American companies' Latin American banana interests. Id.
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the significant risk of financially and politically expensive trade
sanctions,'" the Office of the United States Trade Representative
should recognize the severity of the situation and appreciate that the
WTO will have the requisite authority under the GATS provisions
and the U.S. offer to penalize the United States if the USPS abuses
its monopoly position.
45
B. CHALLENGES TO DEUTSCHE POST AND CANADA POST'S
OPERATIONS INDICATE THAT USPS' OPERATIONS ARE ALSO
FRAUGHT WITH PROBLEMS CONCERNING ABUSE OF ITS
MONOPOLY STATUS
As the GATS agreement leaves Article VIII abusive monopoly
practices undefined, examination of similar cases against national
postal systems can highlight which aspects of USPS' operations
would require reform under the GATS agreement and the U.S.
"express delivery service" commitment. 146 Government reports, the
President's Commission on the United States Postal Service's
hearings and analysis of USPS, and other observers' criticisms
demonstrate that USPS' operations exhibit some of the same
144. See Noer, supra note 143 (discussing the U.S. charges against the E.U. in
connection to its banana import quotas). Finding the E.U. policy in violation of
WTO principles, the WTO authorized $190 million in sanctions against E.U.
Members. Id. These sanctions sparked E.U. fury and a claim against the United
States that the "FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Act of 2000" was a WTO
violation. Id.; see also Stewart, supra note 143 (stating that the WTO approved
$190 million in sanctions against the E.U.). Although the E.U. relinquished its
position in order to avoid the costly sanctions, the European claim resulted in the
WTO awarding the E.U. over $4 billion in damages, demonstrating the enormous
financial consequences of failing to abide by WTO regulations. Id.
145. See supra notes 140-144 and accompanying text (explaining that the risk to
the United States of repercussions relating to illegal USPS operations is real, that
the WTO has authority to enforce the GATS agreement, and that the WTO has
previously undertaken economic sanctions); see also discussion infra Part II.B
(arguing that the WTO would likely find that USPS' abuses its monopoly position
because it demonstrates many of the questionable practices at issue in the Canada
Post and Deutsche Post cases).
146. See discussion supra Part I.D (explaining that some provisions of the
GATS agreement are unclear and that commentators have suggested applying the
lessons from other postal disputes to determine how the WTO might find a
national postal system's practices abusive).
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questionable practices that triggered the Deutsche Post suit and the
Canada Post arbitration. 47
1. Illegal Cross-Subsidization Pervades USPS' Operations
Both the Deutsche Post and the Canada Post cases addressed the
problem of cross-subsidization as evidence of abuse of a monopoly
position. 48 In examining the postal system's infrastructure, the
European Commission found that Deutsche Post engaged in cross-
subsidization, a form of predatory pricing, after considering which
costs were attributable to the universal service obligation, and
calculating whether the incremental costs of providing the
competitive services exceeded the revenue.'49 UPS' analysis of
Canada Post's activities also centered on Canada Post's use of its
infrastructure for both its monopoly and competitive products. 5 °
Although the E.C.'s financial analysis is arguably a more precise
determination of the cost realities in postal operations, it appears that
in this case evaluation of USPS' actual activities and infrastructure
use is a better indicator of possible cross-subsidization because the
President's Commission on the United States Postal Service found
USPS' cost allocation statistics to be unreliable. 5'
147. See discussion infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2 (highlighting some of USPS'
practices that mirror or are analogous to the postal practices at issue in the
Deutsche Post case and the Canada Post arbitration and suggesting that these
practices render USPS vulnerable to legal challenges under GATS).
148. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, paras. 6-7, 35-36 (defining and
discussing cross-subsidization as it applied to Deutsche Post's operations); see also
Statement of Claim, supra note 102, paras. 154-55 (discussing cross-subsidization
issues pertaining to Canada Post's operations).
149. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, para. 36 (performing the
economic analysis and determining that Deutsche Post's revenue was below
incremental costs of providing this service); see also Lang & O'Donoghue, supra
note 69, at 150-55 (outlining major factors to consider when evaluating cross-
subsidization issues and describing the E.C.'s reasoning in deciding the Deutsch
Post case).
150. See Statement of Claim, supra note 102, paras. 154-55 (analyzing Canada
Post's operations for evidence of illegal cross-subsidization).
151. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 67 (noting that testimony on
the topic of cost allocation at USPS was contradictory and stressing that USPS'
internal system for cost allocation contained historic preferences or biases resulting
in USPS assigning more than forty percent of costs to the category of general
institutional costs, while UPS employees testified that their system allocates one
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Examining how USPS provides competitive, expedited services
demonstrates that under the reasoning of the two major postal
cases-Deutsche Post and Canada Post- USPS is cross-subsidizing
its competitive products.'52 USPS uses its enormous infrastructure to
move its competitive products, while allocating these costs to the
monopoly products that generate seventy-five percent of USPS'
operating revenue. 53 The postal monopoly originally developed this
infrastructure, including USPS post offices, vehicles, and sorting
facilities, for its monopoly service, but competitors charge that it is
essential for USPS' competitive services. 1 4 For instance, if a
customer chooses to use USPS' Express Mail service, which
provides overnight delivery to most domestic locations, the customer
could bring the package to any Post Office, where a USPS employee
would accept it, hand it to any USPS letter carrier, or drop it into an
Express Mail collection box normally located outside Post Offices or
other government owned property.'55 USPS letter carriers would later
deliver the Express Mail package, because USPS' expedited delivery
services use the letter carrier employees. 5 6 Thus, the complete
hundred percent of their costs appropriately); see also James Holsen, Vice
President, Industrial Engineering, UPS, Testimony Before The President's
Commission on the United States Postal Service 3, 21 (May 28, 2003) (providing
an overview of UPS' activity based costs and describing the need for such detailed
analysis in the competitive market), at http://www.treasury.gov/offices/domestic-
finance/usps/pdf/Holsen.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
152. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 67 (expressing the
Commission's concern with USPS' possible cross-subsidization); see also infra
text accompanying notes 153-163 (assessing USPS' cross-subsidization).
153. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 67 (noting that USPS has an
advantage in having its monopoly that regularly generates seventy-five percent of
its operating revenues); see also TRANSFORMATION PLAN, supra note 124, at 4
(highlighting that as of 2002 USPS' First Class Mail service, a monopoly product,
provided sixty-nine percent of institutional costs, which include post offices and
delivery points); Eskew Testimony, supra note 129, at 6 (stressing that USPS uses
its monopoly infrastructure for its competitive products).
154. See Eskew Testimony, supra note 129, at 6 (describing some of the assets
USPS can use for its competitive services while attributing these costs to its
regular monopoly services).
155. See U.S. Postal Service, Express Mail, at 1 (detailing the various methods a
customer may use Express Mail services), at
http://pe.usps.gov/cpim/ftp/manuals/qsg/q500.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
156. See id. (noting that USPS' workforce, which as one undivided group is
responsible for delivering all competitive and non-competitive products, is second
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integration of the infrastructure for the monopoly and competitive
services produces cost distortions that result in costs incurred in
providing the competitive services inaccurately reported as costs
related to the monopoly offering.'57
The U.S. government has acknowledged that USPS engages in
cross-subsidization to support USPS' non-postal monopoly
ventures.158 For instance, the U.S. GATS offer contains the language,
"The United States will consider undertaking commitments to
establish or maintain appropriate measures, substantive and/or
procedural to address certain cross-subsidization of express delivery
services, such as may arise from monopoly first-class letter carriage
if other Members are prepared to do so as well."' 59 This statement
appears to recognize problems with USPS without explicitly placing
blame on USPS, but it provides no information about which "express
delivery services" might be cross-subsidized or how the government
believes the USPS cross-subsidizes its services.160 The extent of this
likely cross-subsidization is even difficult for the U.S. government to
gauge as evidenced in the President's Commission on the United
States Postal Service expressing concerns that USPS' inaccurate
accounting system has rendered it extremely challenging to conduct
any sort of verification of USPS cost allocations. 161 In addition to
these criticisms, the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO"),
which is responsible for studying U.S. government expenditures,
flatly refused to believe USPS' assertion that it appropriately
only to Wal-Mart as the largest workforce in the United States today); see also
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 34, 110 (stating that USPS employs
approximately 854,000 people to provide its monopoly and competitive services,
making it the second largest employer in the United States).
157. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 67 (highlighting problems in
USPS cost accounting measures).
158. See infra notes 159-163 and accompanying text (discussing various
government reports regarding USPS cross-subsidization).
159. INITIAL OFFER, supra note 118, at 45.
160. See id. (offering to address "certain cross subsidization issues" without
specifying the issues or services engaging in cross-subsidization).
161. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 67 (noting the Commission's
worries about USPS' possible cross-subsidization and costs accounting methods);
see also supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the Commission's
concerns).
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allocated costs in the context of USPS' e-commerce activities. 62 The
GAO argued that the USPS has failed in this task and that their cost
allocation procedures were generally inadequate.
63
2. USPS' Other Special Benefits from its Status as a Government
Entity Demonstrate Additional Evidence of Illegal Abuse of USPS'
Monopoly Position
Like Canada Post, USPS' competitive products also benefit from
special privileges that the government provides USPS to assist in
fulfilling its public service goals.' 61 These privileges are unavailable
to USPS' competitors, thus giving USPS an advantage over its
competitors.'65 Many of these same types of special advantages are at
162. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE: UPDATE ONE-
COMMERCE ACTIVITIES AND PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 3 (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter
GAO USPS UPDATE] (stating that the GAO did not believe USPS' assertion
regarding its costs allocation), at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress = 162.140.64.21 &filename=d0279.pdf&directory=/diskb/
wais/data/gao (last visited Oct. 24, 2003); see also U.S. Gen. Accounting Office,
What Is GAO? (outlining the GAO's basic responsibilities, which include working
as the investigatory arm of Congress in monitoring and evaluating U.S.
government programs and scrutinizing government expenditures), at
http://www.gao.gov/about.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
163. See GAO USPS UPDATE, supra note 162, at 3 (noting the General
Accounting Office's disapproval of the USPS' financial arrangements, including
its method of allocating costs to particular operations). The GAO reported that
USPS does not have clearly established policies for addressing revenues and costs
associated with its products and services, and that this has resulted in inconsistent
financial reporting. Id.
164. See CHANGING RESTRICTIONS, supra note 19, at 17 (outlining USPS' public
service objectives, including uniform rates for certain services, ensuring public
access to services, and providing some services for free or at reduced cost); see
also MAILBOX ACCESS, supra note 19, at 34 (asserting that the Private Express
Statutes, which guarantee USPS' monopoly, have been crucial to maintaining
universal service); TRANSFORMATION ISSUES, supra note 72, at 31 (stating that
USPS interprets the meaning of its "universal service requirement" for itself);
discussion infra Parts I.E.2.b and I.E.2.c (summarizing some of the advantages that
Canada Post enjoys as a result of its relationship with the Canadian government
that UPS claims are illegal under NAFTA); supra notes 165-182 and
accompanying text (listing benefits USPS' receives from its status as a government
entity and arguing that, as these benefits are unavailable to private competitors,
USPS has unfair advantages).
165. See CHANGING RESTRICTIONS, supra note 19, at 17 (outlining USPS' public
service objectives); see also MAILBOX ACCESS, supra note 19, at 34 (asserting that
the Private Express Statutes, which guarantee USPS' monopoly, have been crucial
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issue in the Canada Post case because they distort the competitive
market. 1
66
USPS' special government relationship generates immediate
financial advantages for all of its operations. 167 For instance, as
USPS, like Canada Post, is a government entity, it does not pay taxes
to the government like its competitors. 168 USPS' tax exemption
includes property taxes to state and local governments, gross receipts
taxes, income taxes, and sales taxes.
169
USPS' unique government entity status also allows it to borrow
from the federal Treasury at preferential rates that are below the
appropriate market rates, a privilege that it shares with none of its
competitors. 70 Without this privilege and the financial backing of the
to maintaining universal service); TRANSFORMATION ISSUES, supra note 72, at 31
(stating that USPS interprets the meaning of its "universal service requirement" for
itself).
166. See Statement of Claim, supra note 102, paras. 65-139 (outlining the
benefits that Canada Post receives as a result of its relationship with the Canadian
government, including preferential customs treatment, reduced fees, and exemption
from the payment of some taxes).
167. See infra notes 168-180 and accompanying text (mentioning a variety of
direct financial and other benefits that USPS enjoys as a government entity that its
private competitors cannot share).
168. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 67 (stating that USPS does not
pay taxes like its competitors). UPS has argued that Canada Post's lower tax rate,
which covers its competitive products, is an unfair abuse of its monopoly position.
See Statement of Claim, supra note 102, paras. 81-82 (describing how Canada
Post's privileged monopoly position shelters it from taxes that UPS and other
private companies must pay).
169. See Eskew Testimony, supra note 129, at 7 (listing the taxes that USPS'
competitors must pay and noting that USPS' immunity to these taxes has a
negative impact on the competitive market).
170. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 67 (noting that USPS can
borrow from the Treasury at favorable rates unlike its competitors); see also
Geddes, supra note 19 (stating that Congress intended that this power to borrow
from the Treasury would give USPS more independence and thereby help it
become more efficient); Eskew Testimony, supra note 129, at 7 (observing
advantages of USPS' status as a government entity). UPS has also objected to
Canada Post's ability to borrow at preferential rates because UPS claims this is a
form of illegal government subsidy for Canada Post's operations in that this right
assists it in providing its competitive and non-competitive services. See Statement
of Claim, supra note 102, paras. 200-214 (dissecting Canada Post's financial state,
suggesting that without the government's guarantee Canada Post would be unable
to continue its operations or invest in its new competitive services).
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U.S. government, it is questionable whether USPS could secure
private financing because USPS' financial situation is progressively
deteriorating.' 71 Among other problems, it has growing debt,
declining net income, and is facing increasing competition. 1 7 As of
May 16, 2003, USPS' financial liabilities exceeded $92 billion,
including over $7 billion already owed to the Treasury. 173 In the
event that USPS could no longer service its debt obligations, USPS'
government entity status would likely force the government and the
taxpayers to assume the debt, a security that USPS' competitors do
not share.
74
USPS' status as a government entity makes it eligible for special
funding from Congress in emergency or special situations.175 For
instance, after the anthrax mailings that followed the September 11 th
attacks, USPS' Postmaster General John Potter asked Congress for
$5 billion to assist in the anthrax decontamination efforts, install new
safety equipment, and to help compensate USPS for the decrease in
postal revenues.'76 The anthrax attacks, however, did not merely
highlight USPS' vulnerabilities and need for security improvements
171. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 4 (analyzing USPS financial
obligations and concluding that the government must reform USPS).
172. See TRANSFORMATION ISSUES, supra note 72, at 1 (noting that in April
2001 the GAO put USPS on its High Risk List, signaling that USPS' financial
future was perilous and it needed massive reform).
173. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 4 (outlining USPS financial
obligations and arguing that these enormous debts indicate that USPS must make
major reforms to its operational structure). Congress has instituted a $15 billion
cap in USPS' borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. Id. at 68.
174. See id. at v, 3, 6, 8, 18, 38, 76, 137, 160 (repeatedly emphasizing the
possibility that USPS inefficiencies and growing debt would force U.S. taxpayers
to assume USPS' obligations).
175. See infra note 176 and accompanying text (stating that USPS has the luxury
of asking Congress for additional funds during difficult financial times).
176. See America's Ordeal: U.S. Postal Service Seeks $5b Aid, NEWSDAY, Nov.
9, 2001, at A56 (reporting that USPS requested $5 billion to assist in its recovery
from the September 11 th attacks and the anthrax mailings and noting that, while
lawmakers said that they were committed to helping USPS through the difficulties
associated with the attacks, they were concerned the bailout compensated USPS
for its prior debts); see also TRANSFORMATION PLAN, supra note 124, at 4 (citing
the September 11 th attacks and the anthrax mailings as substantial factors in the
fall of first class mail volumes that has greatly impacted USPS' poor financial
situation).
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in its infrastructure, it also demonstrated the need for other delivery
services to take steps to ensure that their companies were not putting
the public at risk by transporting dangerous materials. 77 Despite
similar needs to invest in security measures, USPS' competitors
cannot rely on Congress to appropriate funds for these
improvements. 1
78
USPS' government entity status also exempts it from a variety of
fees and regulations that hamper its competitors. 9 Unlike FedEx,
UPS, and its other competitors, vehicle registration regulations do
not apply to USPS. 8 ° As a result, USPS does not have to pay the
costs associated with obtaining the license plates and registration
stickers for USPS' fleet of 215,530 vehicles that the government
requires of USPS' competitors.'
In addition to the vehicle registration exemption, USPS is also
immune to most parking restrictions.'82 Private parcel delivery
177. See Edward L. Hudgins, Bail the Mail?, CATO INST., (Nov. 14, 2001)
(stating that other major parcel carriers will also upgrade their security and invest
in more equipment to protect against bioterrorism and explosive devices), at
http://www.cato.org/dailys/l 1-14-01 .html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
178. See id. (emphasizing that USPS' competitors must pay for these same
measures themselves and pass the costs of these improvements to the customers in
higher prices).
179. See infra notes 180 and accompanying text (describing the myriad of fees
and other regulations that do not apply to USPS).
180. See FEDEx CORPORATION, COMMENTS FROM ORGANIZATIONS: FEDEX
CORPORATION 2 (highlighting that USPS' government entity status excuses USPS




181. See 20/20 Profile: Give me a Break!; U.S. Postal Service Monopoly is
Losing Taxpayer's Money (ABC 20/20 television broadcast, July 19, 2002)
[hereinafter Give me a Break] (containing Reporter John Stossel's analysis that
USPS is wasting taxpayer's money and has too many exemptions from local and
state regulations, including license plate requirements and parking restrictions),
available at 2002 WL 10835149; see also U.S. Postal Service, Postal Facts (listing
information about the Postal Service including the number of USPS vehicles), at
http://www.usps.com/communications/organization/postalfacts.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2003); Eskew Testimony, supra note 129, at 7 (describing USPS' unfair
advantages as a government entity).
182. See Give me a Break, supra note 181 (describing the regulations USPS
avoids as a result of its government status, including parking tickets); Eskew
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services must factor in the costs of parking tickets as a routine
business expense."i 3 As delivery truck drivers often experience great
difficulties in finding legal parking spots in urban areas appropriate
for their large trucks, the major delivery companies rapidly
accumulate parking fines. 84 For instance, the four largest package
delivery companies, UPS, FedEx, Airborne Express, and DHL, paid
nearly $7.3 million to just New York City from June 2001 to July
2002.185
Unlike any of its competitors, USPS can exercise the
government's power of eminent domain to facilitate its operations.
18 6
This power allows USPS to take land by either physical seizure,
"entering physical possession of the property without a court order,"
or it can initiate condemnation proceedings under its authority as a
U.S. government entity.'87 As both USPS' and its competitors'
operations require many trucks and constant activity that produce
noise and pollution, this right can squash neighborhood opposition or
other political difficulties in locating delivery and sorting facilities
Testimony, supra note 129, at 7 (noting USPS' immunity to regulations that affect
its competitors).
183. See Annemarie Mannion, Businesses' Fleets Deliver Client Loyalty, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 4, 2003, at 23, (explaining that delivery services must account for the
cost of tickets in operational budgets), available at 2003 WL 61472947.
184. See Ryan Teague Beckwith, Trafficking in Parking Tickets: Delivery
Companies Say It's Difficult to Find a Legal Spot, NEWSDAY, Sept. 9, 2002, at
A37 (reporting that drivers must park twenty foot trucks in urban areas where there
are very few loading areas, one of the very few areas where parking their trucks is
legal, and government cars often illegally take these coveted parking spots),
available at 2002 WL 2761859.
185. See id. (discussing the difficulties of delivering packages in New York City
and the substantial parking fines the companies accumulate). UPS reports that their
drivers receive about 6,000 tickets a year in the City of Philadelphia alone. Id.; see
also Joseph R. Daughen, Sources: Restaurateurs' Tickets Dismissed,
PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, at 6 (mentioning that UPS receives about 6,000
tickets for parking violations a year and routinely tries to challenge their
responsibility to pay the tickets), available at 2003 WL 3182640.
186. See Benderson Development Co., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 998 F.2d 959,
962 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding that USPS has the power of eminent domain in the
name of the U.S).
187. U.S. v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21 (1958) (outlining the U.S. government's
eminent domain powers, which allows the government to take property for
government use provided that the government provides the former owner just
compensation for the loss of the property).
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that trouble USPS' competitors.'88 Thus, USPS can easily obtain land
for its facilities, post offices, and exclusive blue post boxes in a
manner that its competitors cannot.'89 In choosing these land parcels
for its operations, USPS has the additional luxury of ignoring zoning
restrictions, another hurdle its competitors face, because as a
government entity it is exempt from these regulations. 9 °
USPS can also use its own police force, the Postal Inspection
Service, to investigate crimes impeding its operations and safeguard
its customers' mail and parcels.'9' As USPS is a government entity,
188. See David Beal, Parking Problems, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 10,
2003, at IC (detailing typical community opposition to truck terminals, which
bring noise, pollution, and constant activity to a neighborhood), available at 2003
WL 2619896. Zoning restrictions typically place heavy limitations on where
trucking and delivery companies can locate these facilities. Id. However, as USPS
is not subject to these restrictions, USPS can ignore these local regulations, forcing
communities to resort to lobbying their members of Congress to assert political
pressure on USPS. Id.
189. See Eskew Testimony, supra note 129, at 7 (stating that USPS has the
power of taking land by condemnation or eminent domain); see also Rick Geddes,
Why We Need Serious Postal Reform and What it Should Entail, AM. ENTERPRISE
INST. (describing the various advantages given the post office including the power
of eminent domain to take property for its use), at
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.,publD. 16582/pub detail.asp (last visited
Aug. 15, 2003). USPS can use this power to install green drop boxes that hold
delivery items for its carriers to deliver later. See Beckwith, supra note 184, at A37
(noting that USPS employees drop delivery items in the green drop boxes for
delivery later by carriers, reducing the need for USPS to use trucks). As USPS'
competitors must abide by normal land use restrictions and do not have the power
of eminent domain, they do not have the luxury of relying of these drop boxes that
provide a much needed reduction in the need for vehicles in urban areas where it is
difficult to park delivery trucks. Id.
190. See Eskew Testimony, supra note 129, at 7 (stating that USPS has
immunity from local zoning regulations that its competitors must adhere to); see
also USPS, Competitors Square Off at Conference, CATO POL'Y REP. (CATO
Inst., Washington, DC), Mar./Apr. 1999 (detailing the concerns of Frederick W.
Smith, founder and CEO of Federal Express and a CATO board member, about
USPS' unfair exemptions from regulations, including zoning, customs and tax
laws, that restrain its competitors), at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy-report/v2ln2/postalend.html (last visited Aug.
15, 2003).
191. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 99-100 (describing the
responsibilities of the Postal Inspection Service); see also U.S. Postal Inspection
Service, Who We Are (outlining the duties of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service
and stressing that it "provides assurance to American businesses for the safe
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this armed force has the added authority, which is unavailable to
USPS private competitors, to make arrests and execute search
warrants. 92 As a result, the Postal Inspection Service protects USPS'
competitive and non-competitive operations in a manner that the
private sector cannot replicate. 193
3. Assistance to USPS that is Not Restricted to its Monopoly Services
Amounts to Helping its Competitive Products Because USPS' Entire
Integrated Organization Benefits
Although USPS offers important government services which
necessitates its status as a government entity and encourages the U.S.
government to provide assistance, any government support of USPS
in its current form is illegal under the GATS agreement because, due
to complete integration of USPS' competitive and monopoly
operations, this support directly or indirectly assists its competitive
products. 194 Formulation of appropriate benefits for USPS that only
further its social policy goals is practically impossible because
USPS' operational strategy blurs any distinctions between its
different service offerings. 195 As a result, the provision of tax
immunities and extra assistance, designed to assist USPS in its goal
exchange of funds and securities through the U.S. Mail; to postal customers of the
"sanctity of the seal" in transmitting correspondence and messages; and to postal
employees of a safe work environment"), at
http://www.usps.com/postalinspectors/missmore.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2003);
TRANSFORMATION PLAN, supra note 124, at 47- 49 (summarizing the multi-tiered
responsibilities of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service in protecting the public and
USPS employees and revealing USPS' proposed security strategy that places
heavy reliance on the U.S. Postal Inspection Service's ability to deter and
investigate postal related crimes).
192. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at 99-100 (noting the significance
of the Postal Inspection Service's status as a government entity as it can perform
the usual police activities).
193. See id. at 99 (stressing that the public, including criminals, respect the
Postal Inspection Services skill and resources); see also supra note 191 (quoting
the U.S. Postal Service's goal of providing "assurances," which is a particularly
powerful concept when the provider is a branch of the U.S. government).
194. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2 (explaining how USPS'
competitive offerings benefit from USPS' monopoly operations).
195. See id. (describing how USPS uses its infrastructure and other assets, which
as a result of USPS' government status benefits, obtains at a lower cost than a
private competitor, for both its competitive and non-competitive services).
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of maintaining inexpensive universal service across the United
States, defray costs for competitive services, thus constituting abuse
of USPS' monopoly status because its competitors do not enjoy this
same advantage. 96 Regardless of intent, any government assistance
to USPS will render its operations vulnerable to charges that it is
abusing its monopoly status.'97
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. REVISE THE U.S. OFFER
The Office of the United States Trade Representative must revise
the proposed U.S. offer of "express delivery services" in order to
permit USPS to continue to legally offer its "express delivery
services. ' 191 The United States can still support its powerful multi-
national corporations' attempts to gain equal access to foreign
markets under the GATS framework with a narrower definition. 99
While the current definition meets the needs of this powerful lobby,
the Bush Administration should consider the public interest in
maintaining USPS' operations and proceeding with gradual USPS
reform by insulating USPS from GATS regulations and refusing to
artificially accelerate USPS reform in order to satisfy corporate
interests. 0
196. See supra notes 192-194 and accompanying text (explaining how the
integration of services and USPS' benefits endanger USPS' legal status under
GATS).
197. See discussion supra Part II (highlighting USPS' vulnerabilities as a result
of its special government benefits).
198. See id. (explaining that USPS' current state of operations would be illegal
under the GATS agreement if the United States extends its "express delivery
services" offer); see also INITIAL OFFER, supra note 118, at 1 (indicating that the
U.S. government reserved the right to modify or withdraw its offer at any time
before the conclusion of negotiations).
199. See SINCLAIR, supra note 70, at 4-5 (arguing that the multinational
courier industry has gained the U.S. government as an ally and is actively lobbying
for access to foreign markets).
200. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the potential impact of the Bush
Administration's "express delivery services" offer on USPS); see also
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at ix-xi (summarizing the Commission's
analysis that USPS needs to reform, but that it should be an evolutionary gradual
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U.S. negotiators should narrow the meaning of "express delivery
services" by focusing on some of the additional special services and
guarantees that USPS' major competitors offer in conjunction with
their "express delivery services." 0' 1 For instance, USPS often faces
criticisms for failing to explicitly guarantee delivery by a certain
time.2 °2 The ability to guarantee delivery date and time is one of
greatest strengths of its competitors. 03 For example, FedEx offers a
Priority Overnight Service that guarantees delivery by ten-thirty a.m.
to most areas the following day.2°4 UPS provides Next Day Air and
Next Day Air Savers that guarantee delivery by ten-thirty a.m. or
three p.m. respectively.
205
USPS' current operational structure cannot guarantee delivery
times with such accuracy or offer the broad range of services that its
competitors can provide.20 6 As a result, USPS is only able to promise
process without abrupt changes that could jeopardize USPS' ability to provide its
core services and meet its universal service obligation).
201. See infra notes 201-208 and accompanying text (explaining that a narrower
definition would protect some of USPS' activities from GATS restrictions, while
also promoting free trade, and suggesting U.S. negotiators should adopt narrower
language that helps differentiate USPS' services from its private sector
competitors).
202. See Rick Merrit, Priority Mail Sham, POSTAL WATCH BRIEFING, April 18,
2003, at 2-3 (arguing that USPS misrepresents its delivery guarantees, specifically
the time necessary for delivery, and highlighting that only seventy-three percent of
priority mail reached its destination within the two days as advertised), at
http://www.postalwatch.org/priority-mail/2003-04_bp-priority-mail.pdf (last
visited Oct. 16, 2003).
203. See id. at 3 (emphasizing that private carriers offer a wide range of
delivery-timing options when they will deliver a package for each service with no
variation resulting from delivery location with the exception of the least expensive,
ground delivery service); see also infra notes 204-206 and accompanying text
(noting that USPS' competitors provide guarantees about delivery day and time).
204. See Federal Express, Service Info (listing FedEx Express' various services),
at http://www.fedex.com/us/services/express/us/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
205. See United Postal Service, Zones and On-Demand Rates for Shipping
within the U.S. and to Puerto Rico (describing UPS' delivery services), at
http://www.ups.com/content/us/en!shipping/cost/zones/ondemand.html#demand
(last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
206. See U.S. Postal Service, Express Mail (suggesting that USPS cannot
guarantee delivery by a certain time and noting that the package will arrive the
next day or two days after the customer mails it with Express Mail), at
http://www.usps.com/shipping/expressmail.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
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less precise morning or afternoon delivery on its Express Mail
207 thservice. Thus, the language in the U.S. proposal, language which
provides that "express delivery services" may include "delivery
within a certain time" should focus more prominently in defining
"express delivery services. ' 208 U.S. officials should specify time
frames for delivery in the definition and make a guarantee of these
precise time frames a requirement for services to qualify as an
express delivery service. This narrower definition of "express
delivery services" will include many of the products of USPS'
competitors, but exclude most of USPS' services.2" 9
U.S. negotiators could also narrow the definition by proposing
restrictive requirements for tracking capabilities available to the
consumer.10 USPS currently offers tracking services, 21' but critics
charge that private delivery services provide more frequent tracking
information.21 2 Specifying the frequency of tracking packages and
providing additional tracking criteria could help differentiate USPS'
services from its competitors who excel in this area.21 3
207. See id. (implying that USPS cannot guarantee delivery by a certain time
and stating that USPS will guarantee that USPS will deliver the packages by
twelve noon or three p.m. "to many destinations" rather than all destinations).
208. See INITIAL OFFER, supra note 118, at 45-46 (providing the language used
in the U.S. "express delivery service" offer); see also supra note 208 and
accompanying text (explaining the utility of narrowing the meaning of "express
delivery services" in this manner).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 201-209 (outlining how U.S.
negotiators could narrow the definition of "express delivery services" and the
potential effect of this narrower definition).
210. See infra notes 211-213 and accompanying text (explaining how
negotiators can focus on tracking requirements to differentiate USPS' service from
its competitors by focusing on tracking requirements).
211. See U.S. Postal Service, Track and Confirm FAQs (stating that USPS offers
tracking services), at http://www.usps.com/shipping/trackandconfirmfaqs.htm (last
visited Oct. 17, 2003).
212. See Merrit, supra note 202, at 2 (noting that "waypoint tracking"
capabilities are standard features of private carriers' services, which allows
customers to monitor the location of their packages).
213. See discussion supra Parts II, III.A (explaining that USPS is vulnerable to
challenges under the broad GATS offer and suggesting possible ways to narrow
the definition of "express delivery service").
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B. WITHDRAW "EXPRESS SERVICE DELIVERY" OFFER
Alternatively, under the terms of the Office of the United States
Trade Representative's offer, the U.S. government can withdraw the
U.S. offer regarding "express delivery services."2 4 This would be
desirable because if U.S. negotiators withdraw the express service
delivery offer, it will become more difficult for competitors to claim
that the United States ignores its GATS obligations.215 As a result of
GATS' focus on voluntary liberalization, the agreement does not
compel the United State to make this particular offer or any offers in
this sector, nor does it require the U.S. government to eliminate or
weaken monopolies." 6 Thus, GATS would permit USPS to remain a
monopoly and the governing GATS restriction would only regulate
Article II principles, which in the case of USPS would be entirely
harmless, non-limiting regulations.1 In addition, USPS' competitive
services would not violate Most Favored Nation regulations, thereby
triggering WTO action, because while USPS' competitive products
would continue to benefit from cross-subsidization and USPS' status
as a government entity, USPS' special privileges would generate
equal disadvantages to all other competitors.1 In the absence of the
broad "express delivery service" commitment, USPS could continue
its operations in providing delivery services at low cost to the
American public. 1 9
214. See INITIAL OFFER, supra 118, at 1 (providing the legal authority for the
United States to withdraw the offer before the WTO concludes the negotiations).
215. See discussion supra Parts II.A, Part II.B (explaining that the U.S. offer
will trigger the application of certain GATS provisions to USPS' operations, and
suggesting that USPS' operations would not violate GATS if the United States
withdrew the offer).
216. See discussion supra Part I.B (explaining that the GATS framers designed
the agreement as a gradual process of voluntary liberalization in order to protect
developing countries and assist all Members with the process of opening their
markets).
217. See id. (arguing that USPS would not violate the most favored nation
regulation under these circumstances).
218. See GATS, supra note 11, art. II: 1 (requiring that GATS members treat
each member's services and service suppliers equally).
219. See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.B (explaining that USPS' operations
would not violate the GATS agreement if the United States withdrew its offer).
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C. SEPARATE USPS' COMPETITIVE AND NON-COMPETITIVE
OPERATIONS
If U.S. negotiators are unwilling to revise or withdraw the
"express delivery service" offer, U.S. officials should seek to avoid
WTO sanctions by applying the European Commission's solution in
the Deutsche Post case to separate USPS competitive and non-
competitive services. 22 Such a separation would protect the public
interest by ensuring that any benefits the U.S. government provided
USPS to assist in its crucial universal service obligation would also
not subsidize competitive services.22' Without the separation, such
governmental assistance puts USPS' entire operation at legal risk
because the WTO will arguably consider this support to constitute
abuse of a monopoly position. 22 Thus, this scheme would allow the
U.S. government maximum flexibility to sustain USPS' important
social and cultural functions in whatever manner it sees fit, while
avoiding any potential WTO challenges.223
In order to preserve the competitive delivery service aspect of
USPS' operations, the U.S. government should require the USPS to
completely sever its monopoly and competitive operations to avoid
any sharing of equipment or special benefits upon which the
competitive service currently relies.224 Under this scenario, USPS'
competitive services would lose their government entity status,
which provided a myriad of benefits unavailable to its competitors,
and operate under the same rules and regulations that its competitors
220. See Deutsche Post Decision, supra note 71, art. 2 (requiring Deutsche Post
to separate the mail monopoly from its competitive parcel service).
221. See infra notes 222-225 and accompanying text (explaining that the
separation of the competitive and non-competitive services would require complete
isolation of the services to ensure that the government can only assist USPS' non-
competitive services).
222. See discussion supra Parts II.B. 1, II.B.2 (describing how USPS' operations
allow the competitive services to indirectly benefit from the subsidies for the
monopoly products, which is illegal under GATS).
223. See supra notes 220-222 and accompanying text (explaining why the
separation of the services is desirable).
224. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2 (outlining various aspects of
USPS' operations that give its competitive services an unfair advantage over its
competitors).
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must follow. 225 As the President's Commission on the United States
Postal Service recently completed its review of USPS, concluding
that USPS should focus on its core products, splitting the monopoly
may prove to be the most efficient manner to address USPS' need for
internal reforms and compliance with U.S. obligations under the
GATS treaty.226 However, due to the substantial integration of its
infrastructure for competitive and non-competitive services, and the
USPS' significant reliance on its status as a government entity, such
a drastic step might not be appropriate for the USPS in its current
financially precarious state. 27
CONCLUSION
The Office of the United States Trade Representative's GATS
offer of "express delivery services" will arguably trigger the
application of GATS provisions to the USPS' activities because the
USPS is a monopoly that also offers competitive products that would
be subject to the U.S. offer.2 8 As the USPS cannot claim the GATS
"government authority exception," 229 it remains vulnerable to WTO
Members' claims that it is abusing its monopoly by supplementing
its competitive services with the U.S. government's provision of
special governmental financial benefits and government entity
status.230 Because the United States could potentially face trade
225. See supra notes 220-222 and accompanying text (explaining why the
severing of USPS' operations is desirable and mentioning what sorts of changes
such a separation will require).
226. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 18, at ix-xix (summarizing the
Commission's analysis of USPS and its dire need for reform).
227. See Hudgins, supra note 177 (describing Deutsche Post's gradual move
towards privatization over several stock offerings). This severance solution might
have been easier to apply to Deutsche Post because the German government was
moving toward privatization of the mail system. Id.
228. See discussion supra Part II (explaining that GATS will apply to USPS).
229. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. (arguing that the GATS "government
authority exception" cannot apply to the USPS because it does not meet the
stringent criteria of supplying the service "neither on a commercial basis, nor in
competition with one or more service suppliers").
230. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (explaining that it is difficult to provide
assistance to USPS' non-competitive services because the integration in its
operations results in possibly unintended benefits to the competitive products, an
illegal advantage under the GATS agreement).
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sanctions they should, therefore, revise or withdraw its offer or
separate USPS' operations.23'
231. See discussion supra Part III (recommending that the U.S. government
revise or withdraw the U.S. offer, or alternatively, separate USPS' operations in
order to avoid trade sanctions).
